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The United States is now negotiating its most important bilateral 
investment treaty (“BIT”) to date, a BIT with China.1 In July 2013, 
the two States made the “[b]reakthrough [a]nnouncement” that these 
negotiations would begin.2 Since then, former officials from both 
States have touted the benefits of this treaty, stating that it will 
“unleash far more investment in both directions,” move China toward 
a balanced, service-based economy, and infuse capital into the US 
economy to spur growth.3 
The treaty will also mean more work for lawyers, particularly 
those lawyers defending the United States and China in investment 
arbitrations brought by investors of the other State. As the United 
States has learned in its experience with the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”), the inclusion of investor-State dispute 
settlement provisions in an investment agreement will inevitably lead 
to the initiation of investment arbitration proceedings, and if nationals 
of the US treaty partner have investments in the United States, those 
arbitrations will be filed against the United States.4 Indeed, precisely 
this has been the result in the years following the conclusion of the 
NAFTA. The United States and Canada have faced 34 arbitrations 
between each other, a consequence wholly unforeseen by the 

1. For general background on the bilateral investment (“BIT”) policies of China and the 
United States, as well as anticipated areas of disagreement in the US-China BIT negotiations, 
see W.H. Maruyama, J.T. Stoel & C.B. Rosenberg, Negotiating the US-China Bilateral 
Investment Treaty: Investment Issues and Opportunities in the Twenty-First Century, 7(4) 
TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. (2010). 
2. Betsy Bourasa, US Dep’t of the Treasury, US and China Breakthrough Announcement 
on the Bilateral Investment Treaty Negotiations, TREASURY NOTES BLOG (July 15, 2013), 
http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/US-and-China-Breakthrough-Announcement-.
aspx.  
3. Charlene Barshefsky & Long Yongtu, A Win-Win Possibility for China-US Trade, 
WALL ST. J., June 30, 2014. 
4. That is, of course, assuming that the treaty includes investor-State dispute settlement. 
Such an assumption seems safe because China’s recent agreements have included investor-
State dispute settlement, and the United States has shown no sign of backing away from its 
longstanding policy of supporting investor-State dispute settlement. 
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negotiators of either State when deciding to include investor-State 
dispute settlement provisions and wholly unavoidable, once the 
United States and Canada signed the treaty.5  
Chinese investors are already heavily involved in the US 
economy,6 and this involvement will only increase with the 
conclusion of the US-China BIT.7 Thus, the United States will 
inevitably find itself in the coming years acting as a respondent in 
investor-State arbitrations brought by Chinese investors under the 
forthcoming US-China treaty. US treaty negotiators would be well 
advised to ensure that the United States can maintain the desirable 
level of regulatory flexibility in this treaty, while still providing the 
promised investment protections. Arbitral tribunals, while a useful 
mechanism for settling disputes, are notoriously unpredictable and—
for better or worse—tribunals are not bound by precedent.8 Therefore, 

5. As one commentator has observed, while the “novelty” of including investor-state 
dispute settlement as between the United States and Canada in NAFTA was noted at the time, 
“its implications were not fully appreciated.” William S. Dodge, Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement Between Developed Countries: Reflections on the Australia-United States Free 
Trade Agreement, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 16 (2006). This view is confirmed by 
numerous statements by US officials at the time investment arbitrations were unfolding against 
the United States under NAFTA. See Adam Liptak, Review of US Rulings by NAFTA 
Tribunals Stirs Worries, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2004. Indeed, the US experience as a 
respondent in various NAFTA arbitrations shaped the 2004 Model BIT. Lee M. Caplan & 
Jeremy K. Sharpe, United States, in SELECTED COMMENTARIES ON MODEL INVESTMENT 
TREATIES 756 (Chester Brown ed., 2013). Due to concern that “arbitral tribunals might 
misinterpret certain [NAFTA] Chapter 11 obligations that were formulated in minimalist 
terms” the United States clarified certain obligations in the 2004 Model BIT which were 
previously left undefined. Id.  
6. As reported in Business Week, Chinese companies invested US$14 billion in the 
United States in 2013, particularly in the areas of food, real estate, and energy. Dexter Roberts, 
Chinese Investment in US Doubles to $14 Billion in 2013, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS WEEK (Jan. 
8, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-01-08/chinese-investment-into-u-dot-s-
dot-doubles-to-14-billion-in-2013; see also US Chamber of Commerce, Faces of Chinese 
Investment in the United States, available at https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/
legacy/reports/16983_INTL_FacesChineseInvest_copyright_lr.pdf (last visited August 19, 
2014). 
7. Future investments would of course be covered by investment treaty protections, and 
therefore could form the subject of an investment dispute if affected by host-State measures. 
Under the 2012 US Model BIT, investments that predate the treaty are also protected (as 
“covered investments”), and could also serve as a basis for an investment dispute, if affected 
by host-State measures. See 2012 US Model BIT art. 1, available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/
default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf. (“‘Covered investment’ means, 
with respect to a Party, an investment in its territory of an investor of the other Party in 
existence as of the date of entry into force of this Treaty or established, acquired, or expanded 
thereafter.”) 
8. See Ragnar Harbst et al., Germany, in BAKER & MCKENZIE INTERNATIONAL 
YEARBOOK: 2011-2012 196 (2012).  
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the best vehicle to ensure the appropriate level of regulatory 
flexibility is the BIT itself, and in particular the inclusion of 
exceptions clauses that permit the host State to take certain measures 
that otherwise would be in violation of the investment treaty.9 These 
clauses—which are treated as a whole in this article as exceptions 
clauses—are on the rise in investment treaties generally, and US 
negotiators would be wise to follow this trend and consider the 
exceptions provided in its BIT with China and the language of those 
exceptions. 
Much has been written about necessity and related treaty 
exceptions with respect to the investment claims against Argentina10 
and in the context of the security exception of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade.11 What is lacking, however, is a proposal on the 
way forward for US negotiators seeking to set out exceptions clauses 
in the BIT with China and other future treaty partners. Such a 
proposal may be drawn from the interpretation of necessity in 
customary international law by investment tribunals and a 
comparative analysis of other States’ approaches to exceptions 
clauses in investment treaties. This Article conducts the underlying 
analysis and provides such a proposal.  
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I analyzes necessity under 
customary international law and emphasizes the extremely narrow 
and questionable nature of this plea and the difficulty of applying it in 
investment disputes. Part II describes the evolution of exceptions 
clauses in US BIT practice and notes problems with the three 
different, disparate types of exceptions clauses in current US BITs. 
Part III provides a comparative perspective by describing the 

9. Indeed, such a clause would be in line with other provisions of recent model BITs 
which reduce the discretion of arbitral tribunals in favor of more State-to-State control of the 
standards applied in the arbitral process. For example, the United States has defined the “fair 
and equitable treatment” standard according to the customary international law minimum 
standard of treatment, and set out that ordinary regulatory measures do not constitute 
expropriation. See O. Thomas Johnson & Catherine H. Gibson, The Objections of Developed 
and Developing States to Investor-State Dispute Resolution, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS (Arthur W. Rovine 
ed., forthcoming 2014). 
10. E.g., Jose E. Alvarez & Tegan Brink, Revising the Necessity Defense: Continental 
Casualty v. Argentina, in YEARBOOK ON INT’L INV. LAW & POLICY (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 
2011); William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in 
Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures 
Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 307 (2008). 
11. E.g., Roger P. Alford, The Self-Judging WTO Security Exception, 2011 UTAH L. 
REV. 697 (2011). 
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exceptions clauses in the BITs of other States, noting the advantages 
and disadvantages of these alternative approaches. Part IV suggests a 
way forward for the United States in its BIT negotiations, particularly 
its negotiation with China, by combining lessons learned from the 
weaknesses of existing US BIT exceptions clauses and the advantages 
of exceptions clauses from other States. 
I. ‘NECESSITY’ IN CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 A current discussion of ‘necessity’ in customary international 
law must begin with Article 25 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility 
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (“Draft Articles”) by the 
International Law Commission (“ILC”). As discussed below, the 
concept of necessity in Article 25 is quite narrow, particularly as 
applied and interpreted in the investment context. In addition, 
fundamental questions remain regarding the status and availability of 
this defense in customary international law generally, and particularly 
outside a situation of war.  
A. ILC Draft Article 25—Six Requirements 
The necessity provision at Article 25 of the ILC Draft Articles 
provides: 
1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for 
precluding the wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an 
international obligation of that State unless the act:  
(a) is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential 
interest against a grave and imminent peril; and  
(b) does not seriously impair an essential interest of the 
State or States towards which the obligation exists, or of 
the international community as a whole.  
2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a 
ground for precluding wrongfulness if:  
(a) the international obligation in question excludes the 
possibility of invoking necessity; or  
(b) the State has contributed to the situation of necessity.12 

12. U.N. Int'l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, art. 25, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001). 
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As this text makes clear, a State must fulfill six criteria in order 
to successfully plead necessity: (1) a threat to an “essential interest” 
of a particular State; (2) a “grave and imminent peril” to that interest; 
(3) the action taken is the “only way” to preserve that essential 
interest; (4) that the situation in question was not caused by the State 
seeking to invoke the plea; (5) the State’s action to address the 
situation does not impair the interests of other States; and (6) the 
action lasts only as long as the situation persists. 
The difficulty of applying this provision in investment 
arbitrations has been amply demonstrated in the arbitral proceedings 
brought against Argentina arising out of the financial crisis it suffered 
in the late 1990s.13 In the early 1990s, Argentina sought to attract 
foreign investment by, among other measures, privatizing its gas 
sector. In so doing, Argentina promised foreign investors certain 
benefits, including regular payments calculated in US dollars. When 
its financial crisis struck in the late 1990s, Argentina suspended and 
ultimately reversed these laws favorable to foreign investors, and 
multiple arbitrations were filed, only a fraction of which have been 
concluded. In those arbitrations—some of which were filed under the 
US-Argentina BIT—Argentina famously invoked necessity under 
customary international law to avoid responsibility under the BIT.14 
The arbitral panels deciding these cases stirred some controversy by 
applying different interpretations of the necessity plea, and, on some 
issues, even reaching wholly conflicting decisions. Adding to this 
controversy, the annulment committees considering the panel 
decisions in the cases against Argentina have reached still different 
conclusions regarding the interpretation and application of the plea. 
As discussed further below, some of the problems with these 
decisions were caused by the fact that the ILC provision is simply 
incongruent with the arbitration paradigm. 
To excuse or justify an internationally wrongful act with a plea 
of necessity, a State must first show that the act it took was in defense 

13. See LG&E Energy Corp. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on 
Liability (Oct. 3, 2006) [hereinafter LG&E Award]; CMS Transmission Co. v. Arg. Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award (May 12, 2005) [hereinafter CMS Award]; Enron Corp., 
Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award (May 22, 2007) 
[hereinafter Enron Award]; Sempra Energy Int’l v. Arg. Republic, Case No. ARB/02/16, 
Award (Sept. 28, 2007) [hereinafter Sempra Award]. 
14. See Alvarez & Brink, supra note 10; see also Burke-White & van Staden, supra note 
10 at 314.  
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of “an essential interest.”15 An “essential interest” within the meaning 
of the ILC Draft Articles, is not limited to preservation of the State 
itself, but rather includes also the preservation of the environment16 
and food supplies.17 The term is, however, fact-specific: “[t]he extent 
to which a given interest is ‘essential’ depends upon all the 
circumstances, and cannot be prejudged. It extends to particular 
interests of the State and its people, as well as of the international 
community as a whole.”18 Indeed, the Argentina cases bear out the 
fact-specific nature—and perhaps the tribunal-specific nature—of 
what constitutes an “essential interest,” An arbitral panel considering 
one of these cases stated that an interest is “essential” if it implicates 
the State’s very existence and independence. This panel 
acknowledged that Argentina’s financial crisis was “severe” and that 
“in such a context it was unlikely that business could have continued 
as usual.”19 Ultimately, however, the Tribunal held that Argentina’s 
financial crisis did not threaten an essential interest of the State 
because “[q]uestions of public order and social unrest could have 
been handled, as in fact they were, just as questions of political 
stabilization were handled under the constitutional arrangements in 
force.”20 
A different arbitral panel considering exactly the same Argentine 
financial crisis, however, concluded that Argentina had faced a threat 
to an essential interest within the meaning of Article 25 of the ILC 
Draft Articles. As that panel reasoned, during the financial crisis 

15. The International Law Commission (“ILC”) Draft Articles do not state clearly 
whether Article 25 constitutes a justification, so that liability does not attach, or an excuse, 
such that liability does attach but is excused. See Robert Sloane, On the Use and Abuse of 
Necessity in the Law of State Responsibility, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 447, 482-86 (2012) (noting 
the lack of clarity on this point in the ILC Draft Articles and stating that “the effects of 
necessity may differ contextually”). 
16.  The Gabþikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25). 
17. R. Ago, Addendum to the Eighth Report on State Responsibility, [1980] Y.B. Int’l L. 
Comm’n 13, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add. 1. Although its exact scope is not clear, the 
term essential interest is certainly broader than the “peremptory norms of general international 
law” addressed at articles 40 and 41 and thereafter of the ILC Draft Articles. Sarah Heathcote, 
Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness in the ILC Articles on State Responsibility: Necessity, 
in OXFORD COMMENTARIES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY 491, 497 (2010). Articles 40 and 41 
obligate States to “cooperate to bring to an end” “a gross or systematic failure by the 
responsible State” to fulfill “an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general 
international law.” U.N. Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 12, at art. 40–41.  
18. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY 183 (2002). 
19. Sempra Award, supra note 13, ¶ 348. 
20. Id. 
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Argentina “faced an extremely serious threat to its existence, its 
political and economic survival, to the possibility of maintaining its 
essential services in operation, and to the preservation of its internal 
peace.”21 Interestingly, both panels define an “essential interest” in 
the same way, but they reach different conclusions on the facts. Thus, 
as the Argentina cases demonstrate, the existence of an essential 
interest under Draft Article 25—even when the definition of that term 
is agreed—is not a matter of black and white, and different arbitral 
panels can reach different decisions on whether the interests at stake 
in particular circumstances are “essential.” 
Even if an essential interest is at issue, a State seeking to invoke 
necessity must also demonstrate that this essential interest was 
threatened by grave and imminent peril. Such a showing requires 
concrete evidence: “The peril has to be objectively established and 
not merely apprehended as possible.”22 However, some preemptive 
action is permitted, a fact that distinguishes acts of necessity from acts 
of mitigation.23 Thus, “a measure of uncertainty about the future does 
not necessarily disqualify a State from invoking necessity, if the peril 
is clearly established on the basis of the evidence reasonably available 
at the time.”24 In the Argentina cases, however, this factor has been 
applied strictly, seemingly allowing very little preemptive action. One 
panel, for example, took the view that fulfilling this “peril” factor 
would involve a finding that matters were out of control. Thus, the 
tribunal held that Argentina had not met the “peril” requirement for 
the necessity plea because “[w]hile the [Argentine] Government had a 
duty to prevent a worsening of the situation, and could not simply 
leave events to follow their own course, there is no convincing 
evidence that events were actually out of control or had become 
unmanageable.”25 
Even if a State has satisfied the “essential interest” and “grave 
and imminent peril” factors, the State can successfully plead necessity 
under the ILC Draft Articles only if the act in question was the “only 
way” to safeguard the essential interest at stake. As stated in the ILC 
commentary, “[t]he plea is excluded if there are other (otherwise 

21. LG&E Award, supra note 13, ¶ 257. 
22. CRAWFORD, supra note 18, at 183. 
23. The Gabþíkovo–Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, ¶ 55–56 (Sept. 
25). 
24.  CRAWFORD, supra note 18, at 184. 
25. Sempra Award, supra note 13, ¶ 349. 
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lawful) means available” and moreover, “[t]he word ‘way’ . . . is not 
limited to unilateral action but may also comprise other forms of 
conduct available through cooperative action with other States or 
through international organizations.”26  
In applying this “only way” factor, investment tribunals 
considering the Argentina cases have declined to second-guess 
government action in emergency situations.27 Instead, one panel took 
a comparative approach and found that Argentina’s action in 
addressing its financial crisis was not the “only” way to do so. As this 
tribunal reasoned, “[a] rather sad global comparison of experiences in 
the handling of economic crises shows that there are always many 
approaches to addressing and resolving such critical events” and 
therefore the tribunal found it “difficult to justify the position that 
only one of them was available in the Argentine case.”28 Under this 
analysis, seemingly no State could ever successfully plead necessity 
in a financial crisis because economic theory will never offer a single 
theory to address a financial crisis.  
 In addition to the above criteria, which relate to the character 
of the action in question, the ILC Draft Articles’ necessity provision 
also includes criteria related to the emergency itself and the State’s 
other actions. In particular, the State seeking to invoke the plea must 
not have contributed to the emergency situation. The inclusion of this 
factor—along the lines of a clean-hands requirement—discourages 
abuse of the necessity plea by preventing a State from manufacturing 
an emergency situation in order to extricate itself from an onerous 
international obligation. This is an admirable goal, but as the 
Argentina cases have demonstrated the myriad of factors that mix in 
unforeseeable ways to form an economic crisis have rendered this 
“non-contribution” factor nearly impossible to satisfy in the context 
of a financial crisis. As one Argentina panel stated, as to financial 
crises in general, “the roots extend both ways and include a number of 
domestic as well as international dimensions” as the “unavoidable 
consequence of the operation of a global economy where domestic 
and international factors interact.”29 
 In addition to the clean-hands requirement of non-
contribution, the ILC’s necessity provision requires a balancing of 

26. CRAWFORD, supra note 18, at 184. 
27. CMS Award, supra note 13, ¶ 323. 
28. Sempra Award, supra note 13, ¶ 350. 
29. CMS Award, supra note 13, ¶ 328. 
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interests of other States and the international community as a whole. 
Thus, the ILC provision requires that “the interests relied on [by the 
State pleading necessity] must outweigh all other considerations, not 
merely from the point of view of the acting State, but on a reasonable 
assessment of the competing interests, whether these are individual or 
collective.”30 When a necessity plea is invoked in State-to-State cases, 
this balancing factor reflects the principle of sovereign equality of 
nations—one State may not take action to protect its own interests in 
a manner that disproportionately harms the interests of other States, 
because all States are of equal sovereignty and their interests enjoy 
equal importance on the international plane. 
In the investor-State context, however, where the principle of 
sovereign equality is inapplicable, the proper interpretation of this 
balancing factor is unclear. One Argentina panel took a novel 
approach to this question—and an approach that makes it extremely 
difficult for the responding State to satisfy the requirements for the 
necessity plea.31 In applying the balancing-of-interests factor, the 
tribunal first considered whether the action compromised the interest 
of the other State party to the investment treaty, and then also whether 
the action compromised the interest of the investor. Although that 
tribunal ultimately concluded that any compromise to other interests 
did not preclude Argentina’s invocation of the necessity plea under 
the ILC Draft Articles,32 the panel’s consideration of the interests of a 

30. CRAWFORD, supra note 18, at 184. 
31. The CMS tribunal considered the “other interests” criterion of the ILC Draft Articles 
in the context of the non-precluded measures provision of the United States-Argentina BIT, 
which Argentina had also invoked in that case. See CMS Award, supra note 13, ¶325. The 
annulment committee criticized the panel’s intermingling of these two standards. See CMS 
Gas Transmission Co. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision on Annulment, 
¶¶ 128–36 (Sept. 25, 2007). 
32. As the tribunal stated, “it does not appear that an essential interest of the State to 
which the obligation exists has been impaired, nor have those of the international community 
as a whole.” CMS Award, supra note 13, ¶ 358. This approach is largely echoed in the Sempra 
Award. There, the tribunal stated that “[t]he interest of the international community does not 
appear to be in any way impaired in this context, as it is an interest of a general kind.” Sempra 
Award, supra note 13, ¶ 352. The Sempra Award tribunal also found that the invocation of the 
state of necessity would not impair the interest of the other state-party to the investment treaty. 
Sempra Award, supra note 13, ¶ 390. Sempra Award discussed this matter as part of its 
analysis of the non-precluded measures clause of the US-Argentina BIT because the tribunal 
found that the BIT “did not deal with the elements necessary for the legitimate invocation of a 
state of necessity.” Sempra Award, supra note 13, ¶ 378. Like the CMS Award tribunal, the 
Sempra Award tribunal also considered the interests of investors because they are “ultimately 
the beneficiaries of [investment treaty] obligations.” Sempra Award, supra note 13, ¶ 391. The 
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private investor, as well as the interests of the other State party to the 
investment treaty, makes it extremely difficult for the State seeking to 
invoke necessity to satisfy the customary international law 
requirements of that plea. Indeed, an investment will seemingly 
always be an “essential interest” to an investor, and the investor’s 
decision to initiate an arbitration indicates that this interest has been 
compromised—thus, if an investor’s interests are weighed equally 
against those of host States, then the host State could satisfy the 
necessity plea only when the host State’s action did not negatively 
affect the investment—in which case seemingly the host State would 
not have violated the investment treaty in the first place.  
Finally, a plea of necessity also is limited in time and applies 
only so long as the emergency situation persists. In other words “any 
conduct going beyond what is strictly necessary for the purpose will 
not be covered.”33 This limitation, in contrast to the prior five factors, 
actually causes relatively little trouble in investment disputes. 
Although it will sometimes be difficult to fix the exact date on which 
a situation of “financial emergency” ceases, a reasonableness test 
could be applied in these circumstances. 
B. Problems with ‘Necessity’ in Investment Cases 
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the ILC Draft 
Articles’ necessity provision is unwieldy in its application to financial 
emergencies, as pled in investor-State arbitrations. At least three 
problems are presented in the foregoing discussion.  
 First, arbitral tribunals have been inconsistent in their findings 
regarding whether an “essential interest” is at stake when a State is 
facing a severe financial crisis. Addressing the exact same financial 
crisis and indeed seemingly applying the same standard, tribunals 
considering claims against Argentina reached differing conclusions 
on whether Argentina was protecting an “essential interest” in the 
actions it took in response to its financial crisis. With such 
inconsistency in interpretation, a State cannot be sure whether this 
provision would be applied in the sense of customary international 
law in any given case. Indeed, this finding more than any other, 
illustrates the dangers of imprecision in treaty-drafting—with such 
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tribunal concluded, without analysis, that the essential interest of the claimant investor “would 
certainly be seriously impaired by the operation of . . . a state of necessity in this case.” Id. 
33. CRAWFORD, supra note 18, at 184. 
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imprecision, the treaty parties cannot predict how treaty provisions 
will be interpreted, and they cannot even be sure that a single 
provision will be given a single, consistent interpretation.  
 An additional problem is presented by arbitral tribunals’ 
interpretation of the “only way” and “clean hands” requirements— 
interpretations of these requirements make it difficult for any State to 
ever successfully plead necessity under customary international law. 
As to the “only way” requirement, because economic theory will 
always present alternative ways to achieve a certain result (at least 
hypothetically), tribunals’ consideration of such hypothetical 
alternatives will preclude a finding that certain action is ever excused 
or justified by necessity. As to the “clean hands” requirement—that 
the State seeking to invoke the necessity plea must not have 
contributed to the situation of necessity—arbitral tribunals seem to 
have recognized the difficulty that this requirement causes for States, 
and therefore have weighed the relative contribution of the State to 
the situation of necessity.34 
Finally, the application of the balancing factor is difficult in the 
investment arbitration context, which presents claims of a private 
investor against a State, based on a State-to-State treaty. 
Consideration of the investors’ interests in the balancing factor may 
be difficult to justify, particularly if the inclusion of this factor in the 
ILC draft articles was to reflect principles of sovereign equality.35 
Moreover, consideration of the investors’ interests will always 
preclude a State from invoking the necessity plea because the 
investor’s interests will almost by definition have been 
compromised—indeed, an allegation that the investor’s interests have 
been injured is precisely the basis for bringing the investment dispute, 
and would be the basis of a finding that the host State had violated the 
substantive terms of the investment treaty. Traditionally, this 
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34. The CMS Award panel, for example, weighed the relative contribution of domestic 
and international factors to the economic crisis. In this further analysis, the panel concluded 
that Argentina had contributed to the economic situation to an extent that precluded it from 
invoking the plea of necessity under customary international law. CMS Award, supra note 13, 
¶ 329. As the tribunal stated, the crisis “found its roots in the earlier crisis of the 1980s and 
evolving governmental policies of the 1990s that reached a zenith in 2002” and therefore 
“government policies and their shortcomings significantly contributed to the crisis and the 
emergency.” Id. The tribunal was not swayed from this conclusion by the existence of 
“exogenous factors” that “fuel[ed] additional difficulties.” Id. 
35. And indeed, it is unclear whether such analysis is even appropriate in international 
law—one commentator has criticized this factor as “wholly foreign to necessity as understood 
in the early law of nations,” Sloane, supra note 15, at 458. 
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discussion of the necessity plea under customary international law 
occurs in the context of relations between States, not relations 
between a State and a private citizen, and the context-specific nature 
of the plea is demonstrated by the difficulty of applying its terms in 
investment disputes outside the State-to-State context.36 
In addition to these problems with the terms of the necessity plea 
in customary international law, there remains doubt about the scope and 
indeed the very existence of necessity in customary international law, 
discussed in the next section. 
C. Lingering Controversy 
 The ILC’s records demonstrate that the necessity provision 
was controversial throughout the drafting phases of the Draft Articles. 
For example, the Swedish representative acknowledged in 1981 that, 
“necessity is recognized, in principle, as an admissible plea,” but 
stated that the scope of such a provision was not clearly established so 
that “each case will have to be judged individually on the basis of 
moral rather than legal considerations.”37 Such calls for fact-specific 
determinations were echoed by other ILC representatives throughout 
the negotiating process, and do not inspire confidence that a 
consensus exists on even the general scope of any such plea. 
 Particular controversy arose in discussions of using the term 
“essential interest” to describe what might give rise to a successful 
invocation of the necessity plea. As a representative from Mongolia 
stated, “[t]he criterion of an ‘essential interest’ used in the article not 
only fails to solve the problem [of vagueness], but may even create 
new problems. It is virtually impossible to establish whose interests 
are essential when the interests of two States clash.”38 Another 
representative similarly noted that “[t]he concept of an essential 
interest which a State might invoke to evade its responsibility was 
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36. Andrea K. Bjorklund, Emergency Expectations: State of Necessity and Force 
Majeure, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 459, 463 (Peter 
T. Muchlinski, Federico Ortino, & Christoph Schreuer eds., 2008) (“[T]he state of necessity 
defence is usually discussed in the classic language of responsibility as between States 
themselves. This lack of congruence is evident when tribunals examining a necessity defence 
are analy[z]ing the relative interests of a host State and an investor, rather than the relative 
interests of the host State and the home State.”). 
37. Comments of Governments on part one of the draft articles on State responsibility for 
internationally wrongful acts, [1981] 2(1) Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 77, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/342 
and Add. 1–4. 
38. Id. at 76. 
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very subjective. To a State, every one of its interests was essential.”39 
Such concerns remain today. 
Indeed, even after the ILC’s Draft Articles—including the 
necessity provision—were adopted, James Crawford wrote that “[i]t 
has been doubted whether necessity exists as an omnibus category.”40 
And indeed, these doubts come from diverse and illustrious sources. 
As stated in the decision of the Rainbow Warrior arbitration, “there is 
no general principle allowing the defence of necessity.”41 Moreover, 
as scholars have noted, even if such a plea exists in general 
international law, “[t]he limits of defences such as necessity in terms 
of customary international law and its application in the investment 
context remain to be worked out.”42 Indeed, these Draft Articles 
“were drafted to serve general purposes; they were not drafted to 
serve the interests of investor-State arbitration, or even of investment 
generally.”43 
The idea of pleading necessity as an exit for international law 
obligations can be traced to Grotius and Vattel, and even further in 
history to religious texts.44 Early arbitral decisions conflated necessity 
and force majeure, however, and invocations of this plea under 
circumstances other than war were generally unsuccessful. In the 

39.  Draft articles on State responsibility. Texts adopted by the Drafting Committee: 
articles 33 to 35 - reproduced in document A/CN.4/SR.1635, paras. 42, 53 and 62, [1980] 1 
Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 271, ¶ 48, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.318. 
40. James Crawford, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 564 
(Oxford University Press 8th ed. 2012) 
41. Fr. v. N.Z., 1990 R.I.A.A. 254, ¶ 78 (Apr. 30). 
42. M. Sornarajah, Evolution or Revolution in International Investment Arbitration? The 
Descent into Normlessness, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 
631, 656 (Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011). 
43. Bjorklund, supra note 36, at 522. 
44.  As one author has noted, “States recognize the need for a residual ‘exit’ mechanism 
from legal obligations—the contours of which are as uncertain as the possible contingencies 
presumably embraced in the [necessity] doctrine.” Diane A. Desierto, Necessity and National 
Emergency Clauses Sovereignty in Modern Treaty Interpretation, in 3 INTERNATIONAL 
LITIGATION IN PRACTICE 116 (Loretta Malintoppi & Eduardo Valencia–Ospina eds., 2012). 
As Desierto sets out, doctrines of necessity are present in several areas of international law, 
including human rights and the law of armed conflict, as well as in international investment 
law and international trade law. She suggests that an additional reason to include a necessity 
clause in a treaty may be “to prevent abusive or disingenuous invocation of necessity by other 
treaty parties.” Id. at 129. By specifically setting out the scope of a necessity defense, this 
argument goes, a state may preclude a treaty partner from taking a very broad view of 
necessity under customary international law. Id. at 129–30. This alternative rationale for 
including a necessity clause is not implausible, but it is also inconsistent with the ILC 
definition of necessity, which, in fact, appears quite narrow (and narrower than the necessity 
clauses included in investment treaties). 
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1912 Russian Indemnities arbitration, for example, Turkey invoked 
force majeure and argued that it was not able to repay Russia for 
certain loans due to both financial problems and domestic 
insurrections.45 Although the tribunal acknowledged “international 
law must adapt itself to political necessities,”46 it declined to accept 
Turkey’s plea because Turkey had been able to obtain loans and make 
other large payments during the relevant time.47 
Thereafter a similar plea—with a similar result—was presented 
in 1929 in the Brazilian loans case.48 There, the primary question was 
whether Brazil was obligated to repay certain amounts to foreign 
bondholders in paper francs or gold francs, a question which acquired 
particular significance after paper francs suffered significant 
depreciation.49 Brazil argued that it faced a situation of force majeure 
due to war that should annul, or at least suspend its obligations. The 
Permanent Court of International Justice, however, rejected this 
argument, reasoning that Brazil’s inability to pay in gold coins did not 
preclude payment in another form for the gold value.50 Again, 
however, the tribunal did not reject the existence of the plea, but 
rather found that its requirements were not satisfied under the facts at 
issue. 
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45. As the tribunal stated:  
Turkey was, from 1881 to 1902, in the midst of financial difficulties of the 
utmost seriousness, combined with domestic and foreign events (insurrections, 
wars) which forced it to make special disposition of a large part of its 
revenues, to submit to foreign control a part of its finances, to even grant a 
delay in payment to the Ottoman Bank, and, generally, it could satisfy its 
obligations only through delay and postponements, and even then at great 
sacrifice. 
Russ. v. Turk., 11 R.I.A.A. 421 (1912). 
46. Id. 
47. The tribunal held that, due to Turkey’s ability to meet other financial obligations, 
“[i]t would clearly be exaggeration to allow that the payment (or the securing of a loan for the 
payment) of the comparatively small sum [at issue in that case] would imperil the existence of 
the Ottoman Empire or seriously compromise its internal or external situation .” Id. 
48. Braz. v. Fr. 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. C) No. 16, at 120 (May 27). 
49. Id. at 95–96, 100. As the Permanent Court of International Justice (“PCIJ”) noted, 
the legal challenge was brought “after the increasing depreciation of the French franc, the 
service of the loan was effected in that currency on the basis of its current value, ultimately led 
to protests and the taking of steps by the bondholders with a view to inducing the French 
Government to intervene.” Id. at 100. 
50. Id. at 122–23. 
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Other cases in which necessity was invoked to avoid 
international obligations follow a similar pattern.51 Thus, even before 
the ILC formulated its strict criteria for establishing a necessity plea 
in the Draft Articles, international tribunals generally declined to 
recognize financial hardship as permitting States to avoid 
international obligations. Though these tribunals did generally 
acknowledge the existence of such a plea, they construed it narrowly 
and simply found that it did not apply to the circumstances before 
them. Such a construction of the plea permits States only very limited 
flexibility of action in responding to emergency situations. 
The cyclical economic trends that affect the burdens imposed on 
host States due to investment obligations, however, require reasonable 
flexibility in permitting States to respond to emergency situations, 
including financial emergencies. As demonstrated above, the 
customary international law plea of “necessity” is inadequate to 
balance States’ interests in legitimate regulation with protection of 
investors. Particularly in recent years, as economic volatility has 
increased, States have sought—and needed—additional flexibility in 
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51. For example, a similar plea was also made and rejected in the Société Commerciale 
de Belgique, 1939 P.C.I.J. (ser. C) No. 87 (June 15). Before that case was filed, Belgium had 
won an award of 6 million “gold dollars” against Greece based on Greece’s failure to pay as 
promised on certain bonds sold to Belgian holders to finance a Greek railway project. Id. at 
166–67. When Greece failed to pay this award, Belgium brought a second arbitration. In this 
second proceeding, Greece acknowledged that the first award was binding, but argued that “by 
reason of its budgetary and monetary situation . . . it is materially impossible for the Greek 
Government to execute the awards as formulated” and requested that the Greek Government 
and the Belgian entity should “be left to come to some arrangement for the execution of these 
awards which will correspond with the budgetary and monetary capacity of the debtor.” Id. at 
165. As in the previous arbitrations, Greece’s plea ultimately did not attract the tribunal’s 
support. Although the majority acknowledged that a settlement by the two governments 
regarding the dispute was “highly desirable,” the majority found that it lacked jurisdiction, 
based on the parties’ statements, to rule on Greece’s capacity to pay. Id. This rationale is 
unsatisfying and appears to be a rather obvious attempt to sidestep the relevant question. 
However, even if the tribunal had taken a broader view of its jurisdiction, the result would 
likely have been the same—and Greece’s debt would not have been forgiven—because even 
the judges filing separate opinions who would have reached this question did not necessarily 
agree with Greece’s argument. Judge Hudson stated that it was unnecessary to determine 
whether Greece had the capacity to pay the amount of the award from the previous arbitral 
decision because Belgium had clarified in its pleadings that it was not seeking a lump sum 
payment of that amount. Id. at 167. Moreover, Judge Hudson also thought that Greece had not 
proven its inability to pay the amounts awarded. Id. Judge Eysinga did not state whether he 
believed such a case had been made, but rather stated that such a determination was within the 
tribunal’s jurisdiction, despite the parties’ statements to the contrary. Judge Eysinga did note, 
however, that such a determination could be made only after receiving an expert report. Id. at 
182.  
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maintaining their economic equilibrium. As discussed in the next 
section, the United States in particular has seen the need for BIT 
clauses that aim to achieve this balance. Despite recognizing the need 
for such provisions, however, the United States has failed to 
implement a coherent approach to exceptions clauses in its BITs. 
II. EXCEPTIONS CLAUSES IN US TREATY PRACTICE 
 In light of the narrow scope of the necessity plea in customary 
international law, and indeed, the lingering doubts about the status 
and existence of any such plea, States seeking to preserve an exit 
from investment-treaty commitments have long done so with explicit 
provisions to that effect in their investment treaties. 
The United States has been a part of this trend, including 
exceptions causes even in its earliest BITs and continuing this 
practice today. In recent years, and particularly after the Argentina 
decisions, exceptions clauses in BITs have received greater attention 
from negotiators, including those in the United States. Thus, the 
United States—like other States—has expanded its use of exceptions 
clauses in recent treaties by including fact-specific exceptions as well 
as a catch-all exception.  
As described below, the 2012 US Model BIT includes three 
separate exceptions clauses, one for matters of essential security, 
another for environmental measures, and a third for financial 
services.52 While US BITs have long included some form of the 
essential security exception, the environmental and financial services 
exceptions clauses are relatively new. In the following sections, these 
two new clauses are discussed first, followed by an extended 
discussion of the longstanding essential security exception. 
A. Financial Services Exceptions 
The lengthiest exceptions provision in the 2012 US Model BIT 
is the “Financial Services” provision, which actually includes two 
separate exceptions.53 The exceptions in the “Financial Services” 
provision are exceedingly well-drafted and, as noted below, go a long 
way toward balancing investor protection and the host State’s 
freedom to respond to financial emergencies. 

52. 2012 US Model BIT, supra note 7, at arts. 12, 18, 20. 
53. Id. at art. 20.  
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 1. Description 
The first financial services exception permits the host State to 
take prudential actions related to financial services, particularly 
actions to ensure the integrity and stability of the State’s financial 
system. As that exception states:  
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Treaty, a Party shall 
not be prevented from adopting or maintaining measures relating 
to financial services for prudential reasons, including for the 
protection of investors, depositors, policy holders, or persons to 
whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial services supplier, 
or to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system. 
Where such measures do not conform with the provisions of this 
Treaty, they shall not be used as a means of avoiding the Party’s 
commitments or obligations under this Treaty.54 
“Prudential reasons” under this provision “include[] the 
maintenance of the safety, soundness, integrity, or financial 
responsibility of individual financial institutions, as well as the 
maintenance of the safety and financial and operational integrity of 
payment and clearing systems.”55 The term “financial services” and 
this exception generally tracks similar usage in international trade 
law, and in US Free Trade Agreements, thus providing clarity to key 
terms and guidance on the proper interpretation of this provision.56 
 In the same article, the 2012 US Model BIT includes a related 
exception that preserves the host State’s freedom of action in 
monetary and related policies: “Nothing in this Treaty applies to non-
discriminatory measures of general application taken by any public 
entity in pursuit of monetary and related credit policies or exchange 
rate policies.”57 This monetary policy exception also “derives from” 
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54. Id. at art. 20. 
55. Id. at n.18. 
56. Id. at art. 20(7). The term “financial services” has the same definition as under 
paragraph 5(a) of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”) Annex on Financial 
Services. The so-called “prudential exception” was taken verbatim from article 2(a) of the 
GATS Annex on Financial Services and recent US Free Trade Agreements (“FTAs”), the first 
of which was NAFTA. Caplan & Sharpe, supra note 5, at 817 n.255. 
57. 2012 US Model BIT, supra note 7, at art. 20(2)(a). 
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international trade law,58 thus providing a context to the likely 
application of this provision, despite its newness.59 
The “Financial Services” provision of the 2012 US Model BIT 
further provides procedural mechanisms that help ensure that arbitral 
tribunals responsibly and thoroughly consider pleas under this clause. 
The BIT provision sets out special procedures for choosing arbitrators 
with expertise in finance if a respondent indicates an intention to 
plead the “Financial Services” exceptions in response to a claim 
against it.60 As the article states, “[i]n the appointment of all 
arbitrators not yet appointed to the tribunal, each disputing party shall 
take appropriate steps to ensure that the tribunal has expertise or 
experience in financial services law or practice.” This requirement of 
expertise applies also to the presiding arbitrator, and if the plea is 
raised after the presiding arbitrator has been appointed “such 
arbitrator shall be replaced at the request of either disputing party and 
the tribunal shall be reconstituted” to take into consideration the need 
for expertise to address the plea.61 Ensuring that the arbitrators have 
expertise in financial matters goes a long way towards balancing 
investment protection with preserving a State’s freedom to act in 
response to an emergency.62 Arbitrators with such a background will 
be better able to weigh the availability and relative effectiveness of 
States’ emergency measures, determine whether a claim of financial 
emergency has been manufactured, and are generally more likely to 
reach reasonable decisions on the proper responses to a financial 
emergency. 

58. Caplan & Sharpe, supra note 5, at 818. The analogous trade-law provision is Article 
I(3)(b) of the GATS, which excepts “services supplied in the exercise of governmental 
authority” from the scope of the GATS.  
59. The provision in the 2012 US Model BIT may be more limited than the analogous 
trade-law provision, however, because the BIT provision is limited to governmental measures 
in pursuit of monetary or exchange rate policies. Moreover, the provision specifically “do[es] 
not include measures that expressly nullify or amend contractual provisions that specify the 
currency of demonization or the rate of exchange of currencies” and the exception does not 
affect investment agreement obligations regarding transfers or performance requirements. 
2012 US Model BIT, supra note 7, at art. 20(2)(a) n.19. Despite these limitations, the trade-
law analogy provides guidance for the interpretation of such an article. 
60. Id. In particular, the article seeks to ensure that the tribunal has sufficient expertise to 
address the plea effectively.  
61. 2012 US Model BIT, supra note 7, at art. 20(3)(c)(ii). 
62. A further improvement to the provision might be to require that arbitrators have 
expertise in assessment of investment risk, which would likely provide additional protection to 
investors’ interests. 
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The US Model BIT provision also permits States to take the 
decision out of the hands of arbitrators if the financial emergency 
provisions have been invoked. A State invoking the “Financial 
Services” provision must also request a joint determination by the 
financial authorities of both States party to the treaty as to the 
applicability of the that provision in the particular case.63 If the 
relevant authorities jointly decide that the “Financial Services” 
provision has been properly invoked, this determination “shall be 
binding on the tribunal.”64 This request procedure and its binding 
character allows States a valuable and powerful tool in the arbitration, 
even before the case begins in earnest. In particular, this request 
procedure essentially allows States themselves to decide the scope of 
the plea—albeit jointly—without resort to an arbitral panel, even a 
panel of financially savvy arbitrators. 
Finally, the article also includes a provision, new in the 2012 
Model BIT, which permits the Tribunal to decide, at the respondent’s 
request, the applicability of one of these exceptions “prior to deciding 
the merits of the claim.”65 Provisions substantially similar to these 
appear in the US-Rwanda BIT.66  
 2. Analysis 
The “Financial Services” provision in the 2012 US Model BIT is 
exceedingly detailed and well-drafted for balancing States’ interests 
and investment protection in three particular respects. First, by 
requiring arbitrators to have expertise in financial matters, the 
financial services provision makes it more likely that a decision on 
the existence of a financial emergency will be well-considered and 
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63. Moreover, under the 2012 US Model BIT, it appears that the United States wanted to 
prevent tribunals from relying on non-agreement by the competent authorities in this provision 
as an indication that a challenged financial measure violated the treaty—a provision added 
after the 2004 US Model BIT states that “[t]he tribunal shall draw no inference regarding the 
application [of either financial services exception] from the fact that the competent financial 
authorities have not made [such a joint] determination.” Id. at art. 20(3)(c)(iii). 
64. Id. at art. 20(3)(b). 
65. Id. at art. 20(3)(e). Based on this change, and the change noted at note 63, it appears 
that the 2012 US Model BIT provides slightly more freedom of action to host States than the 
2004 US Model BIT. 
66.  Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Republic of Rwanda Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investment art. 20, US-Rwanda, Feb. 19, 2008, T.I.A.S. 12101 [hereinafter US-
Rwanda BIT]. 
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logical, rather than simply relying on a comparative perspective of 
other financial crises. 
Second, by permitting States to agree on whether the “Financial 
Services” provision has been properly invoked and by making such an 
agreement binding on an arbitral tribunal, this provision empowers 
States party to the BIT to essentially negate the decision of an 
investor to bring a claim. For the investor’s home State, this provision 
resembles an anti-espousal provision by allowing the investor’s home 
State to overrule the individual investor’s choice to bring an arbitral 
claim against a treaty partner. In the traditional espousal context, by 
contrast, the State chooses whether to bring the claim of its citizen 
before an international tribunal. 
Finally, by allowing arbitral tribunals to consider the “Financial 
Services” provision as a preliminary matter, and particularly by 
requiring such a preliminary decision if the respondent State requests, 
this provision goes a long way to discourage frivolous claims by 
investors and offers significant protection to respondent States in the 
form of potentially saved legal costs. Thus, the “Financial Services” 
provision in the 2012 US Model BIT reflects detailed consideration 
and address States’ concerns in the context of invoking a necessity 
plea to avoid obligations in an investment treaty, while still offering 
credible and real protection to investment. Such detailed 
consideration is less evident, however, in the other two exceptions in 
the 2012 US Model BIT. 
B. Environmental Exception 
 The second exceptions clause in the 2012 US Model BIT is 
part of a provision called “Investment and Environment,” which 
appears intended to provide particular leeway for States to enact laws 
that protect the environment. As discussed in Section 2 below, 
however, the “Investment and Environment” provision leaves much 
to be desired in terms of clarity and balance. 
1. Description  
The “Investment and Environment” provision in the 2012 US 
Model BIT states generally that “it is inappropriate to encourage 
investment by weakening or reducing the protections afforded in 
domestic environmental laws” and guarantees regulatory freedom 
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with respect to environmental matters.67 US officials have written—in 
an unofficial capacity—that this provision generally “reflect[s] the 
policy goal of avoiding a ‘race to the bottom,’ where foreign 
investment is pursued at the expense of the environment.”68  
 The “Investment and Environment” provision also contains 
language that could be construed as an exception to investment 
protections for environmental measures. This language provides, 
“[n]othing in this Treaty shall be construed to prevent a Party from 
adopting, maintaining, or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent 
with this Treaty that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment 
activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to 
environmental concerns.”69 
This language has been characterized as part of the “definitions 
and interpretive statements that define the scope of the Parties’ 
obligations” with respect to investment and environment.70 
A similar provision was included the 2004 US Model BIT, but 
the provision in the 2012 US Model BIT strengthened the protections 
of the 2004 provision.71 Thereafter, this “Investment and 
Environment” provision—including its apparent exceptions clause— 
appeared in the most recent US BIT with Rwanda, which was signed 
in 2008 and entered into force in 2012.72 The provision has not yet 
been interpreted by arbitral tribunals. 
2. Analysis 
Ensuring that investment treaties are consistent with 
environmental standards is an admirable goal. Indeed, both developed 
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67. 2012 US Model BIT, supra note 7, at art. 12(2). 
68. Caplan & Sharpe, supra note 5, at 805. 
69. 2012 US Model BIT, supra note 7, at art. 12. Article 12 also provides an opportunity 
for a party to request consultations regarding matters arising under the Article, a provision that 
is generally used in concert with other transparency and public participation provisions in the 
US Model BIT, such as Articles 10 and 11. 
70. Caplan & Sharpe, supra note 5, at 806. 
71. Id. The 2012 US Model BIT added a general provision that “[t]he parties recognize 
that their respective environmental laws and policies, and multilateral environmental 
agreements to which they are both party, play an important role in protecting the 
environment.” 2012 US Model BIT, supra note 7, at art. 12(1). The 2012 Model BIT also 
states that “each party shall ensure that it does not waive or otherwise derogate from” these 
provisions, id. at art. 12(2) (emphasis added), whereas the 2004 US Model BIT only required 
that the treaty parties would “strive to ensure” this goal, 2004 US Model BIT art. 12(1), 
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf.  
72. US-Rwanda BIT, supra note 66, at art. 12. 
2015] BEYOND SELF-JUDGMENT 23 
and developing States—despite frequent disagreements on other 
aspects of investment law—appear to agree on the importance of such 
provisions in investment treaties.73 The ambiguities in the 
“Investment and Environment” provision of the 2012 US Model BIT, 
however, render that particular provision unsatisfactory in achieving 
this goal. 
First, the provision does not provide guidance on what 
consequences might follow from a State’s decision to undertake a 
measure that falls within the scope of this provision. Is that measure 
“justified” so that no wrong is committed, or has the State still 
committed a wrong, but this wrong is merely excused by this section? 
A third possibility also exists—should a measure’s relationship to 
environmental protection be considered in the calculation of damages 
resulting from that measure, and accordingly reduce the damages 
awarded? The 2012 US Model BIT provides no answers to these 
questions, thus leaving them to the discretion of a potential future 
arbitral tribunal. 
Second, what latitude does the United States—or its treaty 
partners—have in determining what environmental measures “it 
considers” appropriate? As discussed below, the self-judging nature 
of exceptions to obligations under international law raised much 
concern during the drafting of the ILC Draft Articles. Despite this 
concern over self-judging language, it is unclear what latitude the 
inclusion of such language might provide in addition to the latitude 
provided by the existence of the exception. The inclusion of this 
language therefore appears likely to cause concern with US treaty 
partners and potential treaty partners, and—even if ultimately 
included in the treaty—will not greatly benefit the United States. 
Third, what is the difference between an “appropriate” measure, 
a “necessary” measure, and—as in the ILC Draft Articles’ necessity 
provision—a measure that is the “only way” to achieve a certain 

73. And indeed, both developed and developing countries have raised concerns that 
investment treaties have led to decreases in their environmental protection standards. See 
Stuart G. Gross, Note, Inordinate Chill: BITs, Non-NAFTA MITs, and Host-State Regulatory 
Freedom—An Indonesia Case Study, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 893 (2003); Katie Zaunbrecher, 
Note, Pac Rim Cayman v. Republic of El Salvador: Confronting Free Trade’s Chilling Effect 
on Environmental Progress in Latin America, 33 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 489, 501–02 (2011) 
(describing one multi-national’s arbitral case against El Salvador and suggesting that 
“[i]nternational tribunals cannot force a government to repeal [environmental and public safety 
regulations] but the potential for massive arbitral awards often produces a chilling effect on 
responsible policy-making”).  
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goal? The use of the loosely-defined word “appropriate,” when 
combined with self-judging nature of the “it considers” language, 
would appear to grant a State such wide latitude that any measure 
even vaguely related to the environment could enjoy protection under 
this provision. Such a result is hardly desirable in a treaty that, at its 
core, seeks to protect investment. 
Finally, how could the treaty be “construed to prevent” a party 
from adopting a measure that is “otherwise consistent with this 
treaty”? If a measure is consistent with the treaty, it cannot be 
construed otherwise, can it? The first phrase, which states that the 
treaty shall not be construed to prevent certain laws, indicates that the 
clause was intended to exempt certain domestic environmental laws 
from application of the treaty norms—that is, if a measure intended to 
protect the environment would otherwise violate the guarantee of 
“fair and equitable” treatment, this provision will preserve that 
provision. The inclusion of the second phrase, “otherwise consistent 
with this treaty,” however, indicates that such an environmental 
measure would not be protected under this provision—if the measure 
violates the fair and equitable treatment standard, it is not otherwise 
consistent with the treaty, and therefore cannot enjoy protection under 
this clause. This contradiction in phrases appears to defeat the entire 
clause. 
As the foregoing demonstrates, the ambiguous terms of the 
“Investment and Environment” provision of the 2012 US Model BIT 
leave much to the discretion of tribunals. Given such broad discretion, 
as the Argentina cases demonstrate, arbitral tribunals may reach 
undesirable, conflicting, or illogical decisions on these matters, 
increasing uncertainty for both investors and States and potentially 
leading to disastrous awards. Unfortunately, similar flaws appear in 
the “Essential Security” provision, also potentially leading to an 
unpredictable decision by an arbitral tribunal and a large award 
against a State party. 
 C. Essential Security Exception 
The oldest and most general of the exceptions clauses in the 
2012 US Model BIT is the “Essential Security” provision. This 
provision contains broader language than the other two exceptions 
and therefore, particularly after the recent addition of the fact-specific 
“Investment and Environment” and “Financial Services” clauses, may 
be construed to serve as a catch-all exception clause. The “Essential 
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Security” provision of US BITs has evolved significantly in recent 
years. Among other developments, discussed more fully below, the 
provision is now explicitly self-judging in both the treaty and the US 
letter of transmittal, and the term “essential security” is left largely 
undefined.  
1. Description 
 The essential security clause in the 2012 US Model BIT, like 
the “Investment and Environment” provision, contains explicitly self-
judging language. Also like the “Investment and Environment” 
provision the “Essential Security” provision does not provide clear 
definitions of relevant terms, such as what might be deemed an 
essential security interest, and what consequences might follow from 
measures that fall within this provision. The “Essential Security” 
provision of the 2012 U.S. Model BIT provides, “[n]othing in this this 
Treaty shall be construed: . . . to preclude a Party from applying 
measures that it considers necessary for the fulfillment of its 
obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of 
international peace or security, or the protection of its own essential 
security interests.”74 
Although this version of the essential security clause was 
included in the US Model BIT for the first time in 2004, it was 
actually developed earlier as part of a previous unpublished update to 
the 1994 US Model BIT.75 Accordingly this version of the essential 
security clause is included in several recent investment agreements, 
namely the US BITs with Bahrain,76 Mozambique,77 Uruguay,78 and 

74. 2012 US Model BIT, supra note 7, at art. 18. 
75. Kenneth Vandevelde writes that this self-judging language in the treaty provision 
was part of a 1998 revision to the 1994 model treaty—apparently part of a general 1998 
revision that was not treated publicly as resulting in a new model. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A 
Comparison of the 2004 and 1994 US Model BITs: Rebalancing Investor and Host State 
Interests, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY 283 (Karl P. 
Sauvant, ed., 2009). 
76. Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the State of Bahrain Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection 
of Investment, US-Bahr., Sept. 29, 1999, T.I.A.S. 13065. 
77. Treaty Between The United States of America and The Republic of Mozambique 
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, US-Mozam., Dec. 1, 
1998, T.I.A.S. 13006. 
78. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Uruguay Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 
XVIII (Nov. 4, 2005) available at http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/
URU_US_e.asp 
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Rwanda.79 Similar clauses appear in US treaties outside the BIT 
context, such as the US-Panama Free Trade Agreement.80   
This “Essential Security” provision has also warranted particular 
attention in the letters of transmittal that the Executive Branch 
provides to Congress when requesting the ratification of a BIT. For 
the US-Bahrain BIT, for example, the letter of transmittal confirms 
the self-judging nature of the clause, and seeks to add substance to the 
terms “international peace and security” and “essential security 
interest.” As that letter provides:  
[The “Essential Security” provision] reserves the right of a Party 
to take measures that it considers necessary for the fulfillment of 
its international obligations with respect to maintenance or 
restoration of international peace or security, as well as those 
measures it regards as necessary for the protection of its own 
essential security interests.  International obligations with respect 
to maintenance or restoration of peace or security would include, 
for example, obligations arising out of Chapter VII of the United 
Nations Charter. Measures permitted by the provision on the 
protection of a Party’s essential security interests would include 
security-related actions taken in time of war or national 
emergency. Actions not arising from a state of war or national 
emergency must have a clear and direct relationship to the 
essential security interests of the Party involved. This Treaty 
makes explicit the implicit understanding that measures to protect 
a Party's essential security interests are self-judging in nature, 
although each Party would expect the provisions to be applied by 
the other in good faith.81 
This language in the letter of transmittal gives a broad and 
somewhat circular definition to the term “essential security 
interests”—the letter defines that term to include not only actions 
taken in war or national emergency but also other security-related 

79. U.S-Rwanda BIT, supra note 66. 
80. US-Panama FTA art 21.2 provides that  
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed: 
To preclude a Party from applying measures that it considers necessary for the fulfillment 
of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or 
security, or the protection of its own essential security interests. 
A footnote to this provision states that: “[f]or greater certainty, if a Party invokes Article 
21.2 in an arbitral proceeding initiated under Chapter Ten (Investment) or Chapter Twenty 
(Dispute Settlement), the tribunal or panel hearing the matter shall find that the exception 
applies.” US-Panama Free Trade Agreement, US-Pan, Jun. 28, 2007. 
81. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Bahrain Bilateral Investment Treaty, 
available at http:// www.state.gov/documents/organization/43479.pdf. 
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actions that have “a clear and direct relationship to the security 
interests of the party involved. Under this definition, then, an essential 
security interest is an interest that relates to security. Such a broad and 
circular interpretation of the clause, combined with the self-judging 
nature of the clause—although apparently subject to a good faith 
test—could be seen to create an exceedingly broad exception to 
investment treaty protections. 
This provision was not always so broad, however, and the 
language of this essential security clause has evolved significantly 
since early US investment treaties. The self-judging language “it 
considers” was absent in the early versions of this clause, and the 
provision applied to measures aimed at both “the maintenance of 
public order and public morals” as well as “essential security 
interests.” These early BIT provisions are based on the 1984 US 
Model BIT, which provided, “This Treaty shall not preclude the 
application by either Party of measures necessary in its jurisdiction 
for the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its obligations 
with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace 
or security, or the protection of its own essential security interests.”82 
Clauses of this type—without the self-judging language and with 
the reference to “public order”—are included in the US BITs with 
Grenada,83 Bangladesh,84 Sri Lanka,85 Kyrgyzstan,86 Turkey,87 
Panama,88 Czech Republic,89 Tunisia,90 and Argentina.91 

82. US Model Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of 
Investment art. X, Feb. 24, 1984, reprinted in 4 INT'L TAX & BUS. LAW. 136, 142 (1986). 
83. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Grenada Bilateral Investment Treaty art. X, 
May 2, 1986, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43562.pdf.  
84. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Bangladesh Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 
X, Mar. 12, 1986, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43480.pdf. 
85. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Sri Lanka Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 
X, Nov. 20, 1991, available at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/43361.htm. 
86. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Kyrgyzstan Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 
X, Jan. 19, 1993, available at http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/All_Trade_Agreements/
exp_005704.asp. 
87. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Turkey Bilateral Investment Treaty art. X, 
Dec. 3, 1985, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/
US_Turkey_e.asp. 
88. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Panama Bilateral Investment Treaty art. X, 
Oct. 27, 1982, available at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/43310.htm. 
89. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Czech Republic Bilateral Investment Treaty 
art. X, Oct. 22, 1991, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43557.pdf. 
90. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Tunisia Bilateral Investment Treaty art. X, 
May 15, 1990, available at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/43364.htm. 
28 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38:1 
Other treaties of that time use this language, with the addition of 
a reference to “public morals” or “morality.” For example, the US-
Congo BIT, which was signed in 1983 and entered into force in 1989, 
contains the following provision: 
This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of 
measures necessary in its territory for the maintenance of public 
order and morality, the fulfillment of its obligations with respect 
to the maintenance and restoration of international peace and 
security, or the protection of its own essential security interests.92 
A clause with substantially the same language, and substantially 
the same explanation in the Letter of Submittal, appears in the US 
BITs with Senegal,93 Cameroon,94 Morocco,95 and—with an 
additional clause—Egypt.96 
The letters of transmittal for these early treaties provide little 
guidance on what might constitute “public order” or “public order and 
morality,” but rather simply state that “this clause declares that the 
treaty shall not preclude measures necessary for public order or 
essential security interests.”97 In later treaties, the language of the 
“Essential Security” provision remained the same, but the letter of 
transmittal provided more detail. The letter of transmittal for the US-
Kazakhstan BIT, for example, which was signed in 1992 and entered 
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91. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Argentina Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 
X, Nov. 14, 1991, available at http://tcc.export.gov/trade_agreements/all_trade_agreements/
exp_000897.asp. 
92. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Congo Bilateral Investment Treaty art. X, 
Aug. 3, 1984, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43544.pdf. 
93. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Senegal Bilateral Investment Treaty art. X, 
Dec. 6, 1983, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43585.pdf. 
94. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Cameroon Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 
X, Feb. 26, 1986, available at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/43244.htm. 
95. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Morocco Bilateral Investment Treaty art. X, 
July 22, 1985, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43580.pdf. 
96. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Egypt Bilateral Investment Treaty art. X, 
Mar. 11, 1986, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43559.pdf. Article X 
provides in relevant part: 
This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party or any subdivision thereof 
of any and all measures necessary for the maintenance of public order and morals, the 
fulfillment of its existing international obligations, the protection of its own security interests, 
or such measures deemed appropriate by the Parties to fulfill future international obligations. 
This last clause , which permits “measures deemed appropriate by the Parties” to fulfill 
future international obligations” appears unique in US BITs, and the meaning of this provision 
is not revealed in the letter of transmittal or other documents.  
97. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Congo Bilateral Investment Treaty art. X, 
Aug. 3, 1984, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43544.pdf. 
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into force in 1994, gives meaning to the terms public order, 
obligations with respect to peace and security, and essential security: 
The maintenance of public order would include measures taken 
pursuant to a Party's police powers to ensure public health and 
safety. International obligations with respect to peace and 
security would include, for example, obligations arising out of 
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Measures permitted 
by the provision on the protection of a Party's essential security 
interests would include security-related actions taken in time of 
war or national emergency; actions not arising from a state of 
war or national emergency must have a clear and direct 
relationship to the essential security interest of the Party 
involved.98 
Indeed, the language included in this early letter of transmittal is 
still included in the letters of transmittal for the most recent current 
BITs. 
Further, although the treaty provision itself is the same as in the 
1984 Model BIT, except for the self-judging language, the letter of 
transmittal states that clause is self-judging: measures it regards as 
necessary for the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its 
international obligations with respect to international peace and 
security, or measures which it regards as necessary for the protection 
of its own essential security interests.99 
Thus, it appears that the United States came to view this 
language as self-judging, or at least wished that the language would 
be so viewed by others, sometime after 1994. The same combination 
of treaty language and letter-of-transmittal language appears in US 
BITs that entered into force in 1994 or thereafter100—specifically, in 

98. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Kazakhstan Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 
X, May 19, 1992, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43566.pdf. The 
treaty provision in question provides, “This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either 
Party of measures necessary for the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its 
obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or 
the protection of its own essential security interests.” 
99. Id. 
100. The transition was not completely smooth because the US BITs with Romania and 
Poland, both of which entered into force in 1994, retain the previous (non-self-judging) letter 
of transmittal. 
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the US BITs with Moldova,101 Armenia,102 Latvia,103 Ukraine,104 
Jamaica,105 Ecuador,106 Estonia,107 and Mongolia.108 
Later, letters of transmittal acquired the additional sentence that 
we see in the US-Bahrain treaty quoted above—with a double 
reference to self-judgment, but the assurance that “each Party would 
expect the provisions to be applied by the other in good faith.” A 
similar combination of the language in the letter of transmittal and the 
treaty appears in the US BITs with Trinidad & Tobago,109 Georgia,110 
Albania,111 Azerbaijan,112 Bolivia,113 Honduras,114 Jordan,115 and 
Lithuania.116 Even in these mid 1990s treaties, however, with this 
double reference to self-judgment in the letter of transmittal, the 
treaty provision itself still contained no reference to self-judgment. 
The only significant change from the 1984 Model BIT provision 

101. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Moldova Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 
IX, Sept. 7, 1993, available at http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/
All_Trade_Agreements/exp_005862.asp. 
102. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Armenia Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 
X, Sept. 23, 1992, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43477.pdf. 
103. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Latvia Bilateral Investment Treaty art. IX, 
Jan. 13, 1995, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43568.pdf. 
104. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Ukraine Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 
IX, Mar. 4, 1994, available at http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/
All_Trade_Agreements/exp_005484.asp. 
105. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Jamaica Bilateral Investment Treaty art. X, 
Feb. 4, 1994, available at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/43289.htm. 
106. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Ecuador Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 
IX, Aug. 27, 1993, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43558.pdf. 
107. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Estonia Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 
IX, Apr. 19, 1994, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43560.pdf. 
108. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Mongolia Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 
X, Oct. 6, 1994, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43579.pdf. 
109. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Trinidad & Tobago Bilateral Investment 
Treaty art. XIV, Sept. 26, 1994, available at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/43363.htm. 
110. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Georgia Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 
XIV, Mar. 7, 1994, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43561.pdf. 
111. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Albania Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 
XIV, Jan. 11, 1995, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43474.pdf. 
112. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Azerbaijan Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 
XIV, Aug. 1, 1997, available at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/43235.htm. 
113. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Bolivia Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 
XIV, Apr. 17, 1998, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43541.pdf. 
This BIT is now terminated. 
114. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Honduras Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 
XIV, July 1, 1995, available at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/43264.htm. 
115. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Jordan Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 
XIV, July 2, 1997, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43565.pdf. 
116. S. TREATY DOC. No. 106–42 art. IX (1998), available at 1998 WL 1788085. 
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quoted above was the omission of the reference to “public order.” 
Only in very recent BITs was the language of the treaty itself 
changed. 
The purposes of adding this self-judging language to the 
“Essential Security” provision included preserving greater regulatory 
discretion of the host State with respect to investment and 
circumscribing the discretion of arbitral tribunals, should a State’s 
regulation be challenged.117 According to one former US government 
official, the self-judging language in the treaty means that “a [S]tate 
has sole discretion to determine whether a measure it has adopted 
falls within the exception.”118 Current US officials take the same 
position regarding the same language the 2012 Model BIT, stating 
“[t]he phrase ‘it considers’ clarifies the intent of the Parties: the 
determination of what is necessary for the fulfillment of its 
obligations with respect to the maintenance and restoration of 
international peace and security and the protection of its essential 
security interests is within the discretion of that party.”119 
2. Analysis 
The current version of the “Essential Security” provision in US 
BITs has three major problems. First, like the “Investment and 
Environment” provision, the “Essential Security” provision leaves 
key terms undefined. The treaty does not reveal what might constitute 
an “essential security” interest, and even the letter of transmittal 
defines this term in a circular fashion. If this provision is invoked, 
arbitral tribunals will be left to use their discretion to determine what 
might constitute an essential security interest. 
In addition, and also like the “Investment and Environment” 
provision, the inclusion of the self-judging “it considers” language 
likely does nothing to preserve freedom of action for the respondent 
State. As discussed below, however, such language has caused 
concern in the international community and is not likely to prove 
popular with investors. Thus, attempts to invoke this clause and its 

117. Vandevelde, supra note 75, at 283. Vandevelde is careful to note, however, than the 
2004 model is not weaker than the 1994 model in its protection of investment—instead the 
2004 treaty involves “both the enhancement of host country regulatory discretion and an 
expansion of host country obligations.” Id.  
118. Id. at n.49. 
119. Caplan & Sharpe, supra note 5, at 813. 
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self-judging nature may be criticized, and arbitral tribunals may 
simply read that language narrowly in light of this larger concern. 
 Finally, the essential security clause, like the “Investment and 
Environment” provision, does not identify what consequences flow 
from conduct that falls within the “Essential Security” provision. Is 
such conduct excused, or justified, or does the presence of an 
essential security interest mean that the conduct reduces damages? 
Stability and predictability is of fundamental importance to both 
States and investors—indeed ensuring stability of legal rules has 
always been a principle reason behind the conclusion of BITs—but 
this purpose is undermined by such wildcard language as in this self-
judging exception clause. 
D. Conclusions with Respect to Exceptions in US BITs 
As discussed above, the exceptions clauses in the 2012 US 
Model BIT, other than the financial security exceptions, are 
unsatisfactory in the goal of providing a clear balance between 
investment protection and host-State regulatory authority. A general 
problem with the “Investment and Environment” and “Essential 
Security” clauses is their self-judging language, which as discussed 
below, is a clumsy way of attempting to retain freedom of action for 
the host State and may not even succeed in achieving this goal. In 
addition, US BIT negotiators should clarify the relationship of these 
various exceptions clauses as between each other to clarify the scope 
of the host State’s freedom of action with respect to each type of 
exception. 
1. Problems with Self-Judging Language 
As noted above, it is unclear what consequences flow from the 
self-judging nature of the “Investment and Environment” and 
“Essential Security” provisions of the 2012 US Model BIT. Does the 
phrase “it considers” have the same meaning with respect to measures 
taken to “ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken 
in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns” as well as measures 
for the “protection of [the host State’s] own essential security 
interests”? What is the significance of the absence of the phrase “it 
considers” in the “Financial Services” provision, particularly in light 
of that provision’s requirement of consultation between the finance 
ministries of the relevant States if the exception is to be invoked in an 
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arbitration? A logical position may be that the “it considers” language 
has been omitted from the “Financial Services” provision because the 
host State may obtain an official joint determination that the measures 
in question fall within the exception. The absence of any explanation 
for the inconsistent use of self-judging language, however, renders 
even the “Financial Services” provision unclear. 
A second problem with the self-judging language is that there is 
no definitive interpretation of self-judging clauses in international 
law, and therefore neither the United States nor its investors can be 
sure how such a clause would be interpreted or applied in a given 
investment dispute. Moreover, there does not seem to be a significant 
difference between self-judging and non-self judging provisions in 
international law.120 The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) 
considered similar self-judging language in an information-sharing 
agreement in the Case Concerning Certain Questions of Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France).121 The ICJ held 
that, although a self-judging clause grants a State “very considerable 
discretion[,] this exercise of discretion is still subject to the obligation 
of good faith codified in Article 26 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties.”122 Thus, the ICJ concluded that it had authority 
to examine whether the State had taken the action in question for 
reasons permitted under the self-judging clause.123   

120. Necessity provisions that are not explicitly self-judging have been interpreted 
narrowly. As the International Court of Justice has stated, “whether a given measure is 
‘necessary’ is ‘not purely a question for the subjective judgment of the party’ and may thus be 
assessed by the Court.” Oil Platforms (Iran v. US), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶ 43 (Nov. 6) 
(quoting Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. US), 
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 141, ¶ 282 (June 27)). 
121. In that case, the clause concerned the obligation to provide assistance in criminal 
matters and provided that, as an exception to the general obligation to provide such assistance, 
“the requested State may refuse a request for mutual assistance if it considers that execution of 
the request is likely to prejudice [the] sovereignty, . . . security, . . . ordre public or other . . . 
essential interests [of the State from which information is requested].” 2008 I.C.J. 179, ¶ 28 
(June 4) (quoting the French court’s decision on the matter). 
122. Djibouti, 2008 I.C.J. ¶ 145. Article 26 states that “[e]very treaty in force is binding 
upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.” Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
123. Djibouti, 2008 I.C.J. ¶ 145. Good faith review, according to Judge Keith’s separate 
opinion, may also require States “to exercise the power [in question] for the purposes for 
which it was conferred and without regard to improper purposes or irrelevant factors.” See id. 
at 279 ¶ 6 (declaration of Judge Keith); see also Stephan Schill & Robyn Briese, “If the State 
Considers”: Self-Judging Clauses in International Dispute Settlement, 13 MAX PLANCK Y.B. 
U.N. L. 61, 140 (2009) (“suggest[ing] that international Courts and Tribunals should adopt, 
similar to the position taken by Judge Keith in his Declaration in Djibouti v. France, an 
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State practice related to the security exception in the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade also indicates that self-judging 
clauses are subject to good-faith review to ensure the clauses are 
invoked for intended purposes only.124 And indeed, even the arbitral 
panel that decided the LG&E v. Argentina dispute—which was 
relatively sympathetic toward Argentina’s arguments based on the 
essential security clause of the US-Argentina BIT—found no 
discernable difference between a self-judging and a non-self-judging 
clause. The tribunal concluded that the provision was not self-
judging, but stated that, “[w]ere the Tribunal to conclude that the 
provision is self-judging, Argentina’s determination would be subject 
to a good faith review anyway, which does not significantly differ 
from the substantive analysis presented here.”125 Although there is 
some room for debate on the matter, the general consensus seems to 
be that self-judging clauses provide little, if any, additional freedom 
of action to the State.126  
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approach that focuses on the characteristic element of self-judging clauses, namely the 
discretion accorded to States to favor domestic over international interests, by drawing on the 
grounds of judicial review for misuse of discretion under domestic administrative law 
systems.”). US government officials—writing in their personal capacity—have acknowledged 
this general interpretation of self-judging clauses, and specifically the ICJ’s Djibouti v. France 
judgment in commentary on the 2012 US Model BIT. As these officials have stated, the Court 
acknowledged that France had “‘very considerable discretion’” and that “the Court conducted 
a very light review of the basis for France’s decision.” Caplan & Sharpe, supra note 5, at 755, 
814 n.251 (quoting Djibouti, 2008 I.C.J. ¶ 145). The authors state that they are “not aware of 
any investor-State arbitral tribunal that has directly analysed the operation of a self-judging 
essential security provision.” Id. 
124. See Alford, supra note 11, at 706–25. A General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(“GATT”) Panel has considered the matter in the context of US sanctions against Nicaragua 
and issued a report that, although not binding, encourages states to weigh competing interests 
when invoking a self-judging security clause, and noting that an entirely self-judging security 
clause could be invoked “excessively of or for purposes other than those set out.” Report of the 
Panel, United States-Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, ¶¶ 5.1–5.18, L/6053 (Oct. 13, 
1986), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/nicembargo.pdf. 
125. LG&E Award, supra note 13, ¶¶ 212–14. In this good faith review, the Tribunal 
concluded that the measures Argentina adopted were “a necessary and legitimate measure” 
because “[u]nder the conditions the Government faced . . . time was of the essence in crafting a 
response.” Id. ¶ 240. 
126. One commentator has suggested that “[w]hile reviewability might seem to be the 
favoured interpretation . . . it is nevertheless possible that States might design necessity clauses 
that give complete deference to a State’s judgment that an emergency or necessity threatening 
the life of the nation exist. In this case, the extent of institutional review might be limited 
instead to the proportionality of measures taken during the situation of emergency or 
necessity.” Desierto, supra note 44, at 142. Such a proposition is illogical, however, because 
the existence of an essential security interest does not depend on the degree of action taken to 
preserve that interest. 
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Indeed, such a narrow reading of self-judging language in 
investment treaties may be appropriate because a broad reading of 
such clauses could defeat the entire investment regime. In fact, some 
commentators have taken this exact position with respect to 
investment treaties as a general matter: 
A sweeping interpretation of necessity, as a self-judging doctrine 
causing the wholesale inapplicability of investment treaties, 
jeopardies the rules-based system and institutionalized dispute 
resolution processes inherent in the architecture of international 
investment obligations. Apart from creating the moral hazard of 
contracting States opting out of international obligations at their 
own instance (and disregarding the settled treaty modes of 
denunciation, suspension, or termination), this interpretation 
foments the threat of unbridled arbitrator discretion.127  
The same view has been expressed by a former US government 
official with respect to the 2012 US Model BIT in particular:  
To my mind, the primary purpose of a BIT is to ensure that 
foreign investment is treated in accordance with the rule of law. 
For this reason, self-judging exceptions are especially troubling. 
A provision that exempts treaty provisions from the judicial or 
arbitral process is very difficult to reconcile with a treaty 
intended to establish the rule of law.128 
The potential for self-judgment also troubled members of the 
ILC in the discussions of the necessity provision of the ILC Draft 
Articles. As one committee member stated, “[t]here was always 
competition between the interests of the two States concerned; it 
might therefore be asked who was to decide which interest should 
prevail. If such a subjective criterion was retained, a State might be 
tempted to invoke the state of necessity abusively as a ground for 
preclusion of wrongfulness.”129 In fact, the representative from the 
former Czechoslovakia found that a self-judging necessity plea could 
threaten the principle of sovereign equality.130 In an equally serious 

127. Id. at 211. 
128. Kenneth Vandevelde, Rebalancing through Exceptions, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 449, 458 (2013). 
129.  Draft articles on State responsibility. Texts adopted by the Drafting Committee: 
articles 33 to 35 - reproduced in document A/CN.4/SR.1635, paras. 42, 53 and 62, [1980] 1 
Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 271, ¶ 48, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.318. 
130.  Comments and observations of Governments on part one of the Draft Articles on 
State responsibility for internationally wrongful acts, [1983] 2(1) Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 2, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/362. Czechoslovakia also objected to permitting a state to invoke a 
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condemnation, the UK representative, in 1998, stated that a State’s 
ability to determine what interest it deems essential would not only be 
open to “very serious abuse across the whole range of international 
relations” but could also “weaken the rule of law.”131 
 Indeed, there has long been suspicion of purportedly self-
judging obligations in international law. Judge Higgins wrote that 
self-judging exceptions to acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction in 
the ICJ are “of doubtful legal status, because it is the Court that must 
determine its own jurisdiction.”132 Judge Lauterpacht took a stronger 
view, arguing in his separate opinions to ICJ decisions that a self-
judging reservation excepting some disputes from consent to the ICJ’s 
jurisdiction was invalid, and that the State in question had therefore 
simply consented to ICJ jurisdiction without reservation because such 
consent was essential and could not be severed from the treaty.133  
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necessity plea in circumstances other than the presence of an immediate threat to the existence 
of the State as a sovereign and independent entity. Id. 
131.  Comments and observations received by Governments on State Responsibility, 
[1998] 2(1) Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 134–35, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/488. 
132. ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS & PROCESS 194 (1995). 
133. As Judge Lauterpacht wrote in his separate opinion in Certain Norwegian Loans 
(France v. Norway): 
In accepting the jurisdiction of the Court Governments are free to limit its jurisdiction in 
a drastic manner. As a result there may be little left in the Acceptance which is subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Court. This the Governments, as trustees of the interests entrusted to them, 
are fully entitled to do. Their right to append reservations which are not inconsistent with the 
Statute is no longer in question. But the question whether that little that is left is or is not 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Court must be determined by the Court itself. Any conditions 
or reservations which purport to deprive the Court of that power are contrary to an express 
provision of the Statute and to the very notion, embodied in Article 36 (6),of conferment of 
obligatory jurisdiction upon the Court. As such they are invalid. It has been said that as 
Governments are free to accept or not to accept the Optional Clause, they are free to accept the 
very minimum of it. Obviously. But that very minimum must not be in violation of the Statute. 
1957 I.C.J. 9, 46 (July 6); see also Roslyn Moloney, Incompatible Reservations to 
Human Rights Treaties: Severability and the Problem of State Consent, 5 MELB. J. INT’L L. 
155, 159, 163–64 (2004) (discussing Lauterpacht’s views and the three possible consequences 
of an invalid reservation to a treaty). Thus, one could argue that, if an investment treaty has a 
self-judging exceptions clause, then either the entire treaty is invalid, or the exceptions 
provisions are simply severed, and the State must offer full investment protections even in 
times of emergency, unless the requirements of necessity under customary international law 
are met. Such an argument could be bolstered with the argument that such a clause defeats the 
object and purpose of the treaty—protecting investment—because it permits a state to opt out 
of those protections at its own will, and indeed the clause is detrimental to the rule of law. See 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 19, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1115 
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan 27, 1980) (“A State may, when signing, ratifying, 
accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, formulate a reservation unless . . . the reservation 
is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.”) Under this logic, a tribunal 
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A counter-argument to the foregoing criticism of self-judging 
clauses may be that self-judgment in the investment-treaty context is 
appropriate because the competing interests in are inherently unequal. 
Under a State-centric concept of international law, a State’s concerns 
for its own essential security or even environmental concerns would 
always outweigh the private interests of an individual investor. If this 
is the reason that the United States has included such language in its 
BITs, however, the United States should simply so explain in the 
terms of the treaty. The lack of such explanation permits the 
importation of general concerns in international law regarding self-
judging language, and these concerns arise out of areas as diverse as 
consent to the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction to the obligation to assist 
in criminal investigations. Clearly at least some of these concerns 
may not be applicable in the investment context, and the United States 
would be well-advised to clarify its use of that language. 
Thus, the self-judging language in the “Investment and 
Environment” and “Essential Security” provisions of the 2012 US 
Model BIT, as currently drafted, likely gains the United States little or 
nothing in terms of freedom of action. The provision costs the United 
States a tremendous amount, however, in terms of credibility and 
reputation in its relations with investors, potential treaty partners, and 
the international community in general.    
 2. Failure to State Relationship Between Exceptions Provisions 
A second fundamental problem with the exceptions provisions of 
the 2012 US Model BIT is that the model treaty provides no guidance 
on the relationship between these various exceptions provisions. Does 
the United States intend to preserve greater freedom of action for host 
States with respect to actions “necessary” to protect an essential 
security interest, than actions “appropriate” to protect the 
environment? Such a position would be rational, and as noted below, 
would be consistent with the approaches taken by other States in their 
model BITs and BITs in force. The US Model BIT provides no 
guidance on this question, however, because the “Investment and 
Environment,” “Financial Services,” and “Essential Security” 
provisions are contained in three separate, self-contained articles of 
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conceivably could declare the entire treaty invalid on the basis of an invalid exceptions clause, 
or perhaps simply could read that clause out of the treaty. 
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the treaty, and the treaty lacks any umbrella provision to govern all 
three. 
Another unanswered question regarding the relationship between 
these provisions is whether an environmental or financial measure 
may fall within the “Essential Security” provision, despite the 
inclusion of the subject-matter-specific “Investment and 
Environment” and “Financial Services” provisions. That is, did the 
“Essential Security” provision ever apply to financial emergencies 
and environmental disasters, and did the United States intend to 
narrow the definition of an essential security interest in its BITs by 
including these subject-matter specific provisions? Such a position 
would be a departure from existing practice by international law. 
Even ILC representatives who were skeptical of other parts of the 
necessity provision of the ILC draft articles agreed that an 
environmental disaster could constitute an essential interest. As the 
UK representative stated, essential interests were “interests so 
essential that a breach of them threatens the economic or social 
stability of the State, or serious personal injury or environmental 
damage on a massive scale.”134 
 Indeed this was precisely the holding of the ICJ in the 
Gabþíkovo Nagymaros case, and has been alluded to in other cases. 
There, the ICJ held that it had “no difficulty in acknowledging that 
the concerns expressed by Hungary for its natural environment . . . 
related to an ‘essential interest’ of that State” within the meaning of 
the then-current version of the ILC Draft Articles.135 In Gabþíkovo 
Nagymaros, the ICJ also repeated a statement from its Advisory 
Opinion in the Legality of the Threat of Nuclear Weapons, that “‘the 
environment is not an abstraction but represents the living space, 
the quality of life and the very health of human beings, including 
generations unborn. The existence of the general obligation of 
States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control 
respect the environment of other States or of areas beyond national 
control is now part of the corpus of international law relating to the 
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134.  Comments and observations received by Governments on State Responsibility, 
[2001] 2(1) Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 56, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/515. In fact, the United Kingdom 
took the position that necessity was “at the very edge of the rule of law” and that “it should not 
be included in a set of draft articles that describe the routine framework of legal responsibility 
between states.” Id. 
135. The Gabþikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 41, ¶ 53 (Sept. 
25). 
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environment.’”136 Indeed this concept was expanded into a duty to 
protect the environment in the Pulp Mills case, where the ICJ 
stated that “[a] [S]tate is . . . obliged to use all the means at its 
disposal in order to avoid activities which take place in its territory 
. . . causing significant damage to the environment of another 
State. This court has established that this obligation is ‘now part of 
the corpus of international law relating to the environment.’”137 
Thus, protection of the environment may arguably be an essential 
security interest, and the failure to define that the term in the 2012 
US Model BIT leads to confusion, particularly in light of the 
inclusion of the “Investment and Environment” provision. 
An additional problem in the relationship between the articles is 
presented by the differing verbs used therein. Under the “Investment 
and Environment” provision, the United States is not precluded from 
“adopting, maintaining, or enforcing” measures that fall within the 
clause. Under the “Essential Security” clause, by contrast, the United 
States is not precluded from “applying” a measure that falls within the 
clause. One reading of this difference in language may be that a State 
may “apply” existing measures to address matters of essential 
security, but it may not “adopt” additional measures to protect 
essential security interests, whereas it may adopt such measures to 
protect the environment. Indeed, this reading would be a significant 
limitation on the host State’s ability to protect its essential security 
interests, and would mean that the State has more freedom in 
responding to environmental concerns than essential security matters. 
An alternative reading is that the term “applying” encompasses the 
terms “adopting, maintaining, or enforcing” and includes an even 
broader swath of State action that would not necessarily follow the 
usual course of legislation. Such a reading is logical because the 
United States must have intended to preserve greater ability to react to 
a threatened “essential security” interest than in the area of 
environmental legislation, particularly because the “essential interest” 
category appears to include wars, insurrections, and similar actions. 
Although this second reading of the clause appears more logical than 
the first, the first reading remains plausible and thus could be adopted 
by an arbitral tribunal. If the United States intends to preserve greater 
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136. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
241-42, ¶ 29 (July 8). 
137. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 14, 56, ¶ 101 
(Apr. 20). 
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freedom of action in the “Essential Security” provision—as the 
second reading would indicate—it should explicitly so state in the 
treaty. As the treaty stands, the matter is left to the discretion of 
arbitral tribunals. 
There is an alternative to leaving such questions to arbitral 
tribunals, however. As discussed in the following section, other States 
have been creative in drafting their exceptions clauses, and have come 
up with various ways to preserve their freedom of action including 
reporting requirements and detailed provisions relating to the 
consequences of invoking these clause for both liability of the host 
State, and potential measures of damages. By incorporating some of 
these methods, the United States could improve the functioning and 
clarity of its BITs, while still protecting investments and preserving 
freedom of action of the host State in emergency situations. 
III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF BIT EXCEPTIONS 
As noted above, the United States is not the only State to 
recognize the need to protect its “essential security” or similar 
interests in its investment treaties. In fact, such an exceptions 
provision was included in the very first investment treaty, between 
Germany and Pakistan, concluded in 1959.138 In that BIT, Pakistan 
reserved the right to deny investment protections for reasons of public 
security by appending the following statement to its acceptance of the 
treaty: 
It is our understanding that, intending to facilitate and promote 
investments by German nationals or companies in Pakistan, the 
Government of Pakistan will, prior to the entry into force of an 
establishment treaty the negotiation of which has been provided 
for, grant necessary permits to German nationals who desire to 
enter, stay and carryon activities in Pakistan in connection with 
investments by German nationals or companies except in so far 
as reasons of public security and order, public health or morality 
may warrant otherwise.139 
Like Pakistan’s statement in its BIT with Germany, early model 
treaties and non-binding instruments also demonstrate that States 
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138. Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (with Protocol and 
exchange of notes), Ger.-Pak., November 25, 1959, 24 U.N.T.S. 6575. 
139. Id. at n.V (emphasis added). 
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sought specific exceptions for cases of war, revolution, or similar 
situations. These traditional clauses are discussed in Section A below. 
As discussed in Section B, States have recently begun refining 
this practice and including particularized exceptions clauses more 
frequently in their investment treaties. A comparison of these recent 
clauses to their predecessors reveals that States have begun to 
consider the circumstances under which they might seek to invoke an 
exception to investment-treaty protections, and States appear to seek 
to reserve such an exception not only for situations of armed conflict 
but also for a financial emergency or an environmental disaster, as the 
United States has done. As noted in this Section, this development in 
the exceptions clauses reflects States’ evolving thinking in how to 
treat investment protections in times of emergency, and this 
comparative process offers guidance for the United States in its BIT 
negotiations with China and beyond. 
 A. Traditional Exceptions Clauses 
 Even the oldest BITs include clauses that permit exceptions to 
certain investment protections in times of war, generally requiring 
only treatment as favorable as domestic enterprises during such times. 
One such clause has long been included in the German model BIT, 
and still remains part of that treaty. The current iteration, which 
differs only slightly from the original provision, states: 
Investors of either Contracting State whose investments suffer 
losses in the territory of the other Contracting State owing to war 
or other armed conflict, revolution, a state of national emergency, 
or revolt, shall be accorded treatment no less favourable by such 
other Contracting State than that State accords to its own 
investors as regards restitution, indemnification, compensation or 
other valuable consideration.140 
This provision, which essentially requires national treatment 
during situations of armed conflict, is echoed in the treaties of several 
other States.141 In fact, a similar provision appears in the 1959 Draft 
Convention on Investments Abroad, more commonly known as the 
Abs-Shawcross Convention, after its principle drafters Herman Abs, 

140. Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments art. 4, § 3, 2008, Federal Ministry 
for Economics and Technology. 
141. E.g., Netherlands Model Treaty art. 7. 
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of the Deutsche Bank, and Lord Shawcross, former UK Attorney 
General.142 As the Abs-Shawcross provision states: 
No Party may take measures derogating from the present 
Convention unless it is involved in war, hostilities, or other 
public emergency, which threatens its life; and such measures 
shall be limited in extent and duration to those strictly required 
by the exigencies of the situation. Nothing in this Article shall be 
construed as superseding the generally accepted laws of war.143 
Other non-binding instruments of this time also foreshadowed 
future investment-treaty exceptions. Under the 1961 Harvard Draft 
Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries 
to Aliens, for example, treatment of alien property that would be 
otherwise wrongful could be justified based on “[t]he actual necessity 
of maintaining public order, health, or morality in accordance with 
laws enacted for that purpose” so long as those measures did not 
unreasonably depart from domestic law or principles of justice.144  
This provision—with its reference to public order and 
morality—rather obviously foreshadows the original version of the 
“Essential Security” provision in US BITs, and similar provisions in 
other States’ BITs. The important difference between this Harvard 
Draft Convention and the original US “Essential Security” clause, 
however, is the Harvard Draft Convention’s requirement that the 
measures do not unreasonably depart from domestic law or principles 
of justice. The inclusion of this language indicates that investments 
would still be protected to some degree even if measures were taken 
to achieve public order, health, or morality, and thus offers a clear 
balance between the interests of investors and those of States. 
A guarantee of some protection was not included, however, in 
the “derogations” provision of the 1967 Organization for Economic 
Co-Operation and Development (“OECD”) Draft Convention on the 
Protection of Foreign Property: 
A party may take measures in derogation of this Convention only 
if: 
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142. ANDREW NEWCOMB & LLUIS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT 
TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 21–22 (2009). 
143. Herman Abs & Lord Shawcross, The Proposed Convention to Protect Foreign 
Investment: A Round Table Comment on the Draft Convention by its Authors, 9 J. PUB. L. 
116–17 (1960) (text of art. V). 
144. Louis B. Sohn & R.R. Baxter, Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic 
Interests of Aliens, 55 AM. J. INT’L L. 545, 549 (1961). 
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(i) involved in war, hostilities or other grave public 
emergency of a nation-wide character due to force majeure 
or provoked by unforeseen circumstances or threatening its 
essential security interests; or 
(ii) taken pursuant to decisions of the Security Council of 
the United Nations or to recommendations of the Security 
Council or General Assembly of the United Nations 
relating to the maintenance or restoration of international 
peace and security. 
Any such measures shall be provisional in character and shall be 
limited in extent and duration to those strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation.145 
Elements of the “Essential Security” provision in the US 2012 
Model BIT are also clear in this provision of the OECD Draft 
Convention—in particular, the reference to UN Security Council 
actions and the maintenance of international peace and security. 
 Although these instruments are forward-thinking in their use 
of exceptions clauses, they do not set out a hierarchy of interests that 
allows more or less derogation from the investment treaty protections, 
depending on the gravity of the interest protected. Instead, these 
provisions differ among each other as to what protection, if any, 
might apply when an exceptions provision is invoked: Under the 
German Model Treaty, foreign investors can expect national 
treatment in a time of war; under the Harvard Draft Articles, they can 
expect to be treated within the provisions of national law and 
principles of justice; under the Abs-Shawcross and the OECD Draft 
Conventions, however, investors can expect no such protection. 
As discussed in the next section, these early BIT practices and 
non-binding instruments have evolved into more complex and more 
deft treaty provisions, as States have realized the particular situations 
in which they might seek an exception to investment-treaty 
protections, and exactly the extent of any such exception. These 
newer treaties present a more sophisticated understanding of the 
relative interests that might warrant the invocation of an exceptions 
clause, and the variety in the consequences that might follow from the 
application of such a clause. 
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B. Recent Developments in Exceptions Clauses 
Some States have used the same techniques as the US in 
developing recent exceptions clauses, namely the use of self-judging 
language and the inclusion of fact-specific exceptions clauses for 
financial emergencies and environmental disasters. Other States have 
employed alternative techniques in exceptions clauses, including the 
establishment of a clear hierarchy among the States’ interests that 
give rise to an exception, reporting requirements among treaty parties 
for suspension of investment protections, and a diversity of 
consequences for the suspending State depending on the gravity of the 
interest protected in the exceptions clause. One of the most important 
aspects of other States’ recent exceptions clauses, however, is their 
coherence within the treaty itself. To illustrate this coherence of 
exceptions within a single clause, this section presents exceptions 
clauses in their entirety from the most relevant treaties and model 
treaties. 
1. The UK 2008 Model IPPA 
The UK 2008 Model Investment Promotion and Protection 
Agreement (“IPPA”) contains—in one article, called “Exceptions”—
both a general exceptions provision that provides national treatment 
or MFN treatment in undefined emergencies, and also a specific 
exceptions provision for times of financial emergency. As this 
provision states: 
(1) The provisions of this Agreement relative to the grant of 
treatment not less favourable than that accorded to the nationals 
or companies of either Contracting Party or any third State shall 
not be construed as to preclude the adoption or enforcement by a 
Contracting party of measures which are necessary to protect 
national security, public security or public order . . . .  
(2) Where, in exceptional circumstances, payments and capital 
movements between the Contracting Parties threaten to cause 
serious difficulties for the operation of monetary policy or 
exchange rate policy in either Contracting Party, the Contracting 
Party concerned may take safeguard measures with regard to 
capital movements if such measures are strictly necessary. The 
Contracting Party adopting the safeguard measures shall inform 
the other Contracting Party forthwith and present, as soon as 
possible, a time schedule for their removal.146 
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The first paragraph quoted above preserves the ability of the 
British government to block certain mergers under the Enterprise Act 
of 2002, and to send matters to review by a compensation 
commission.147 This provision appears to provide significant freedom 
of action in the establishment phase of the investment, but does little 
to protect freedom of action once that investment has been made.148 
The second paragraph of this exceptions provision appears to 
have been added to the Model IPPA in 2006,149 thus even before the 
financial crisis of 2008. This paragraph includes a reporting 
requirement for the State taking measures to address threats to its 
monetary or exchange rate policy. This reporting requirement likely 
serves to discourage frivolous or after-the-fact invocations of this 
provision, made only after an investment arbitration has been 
initiated. Seemingly, with this reporting requirement, if a State did not 
inform its treaty partner of the measure within a reasonable time of 
taking the steps in question, then the State did not actually intend for 
those measures to be deemed within the financial portion of this 
“Exceptions” provision. 
This “Exceptions” provision in the UK Model IPPA is combined 
with a separate “Compensation for Losses” provision, which 
essentially provides for national treatment during times of war, 
national emergency, or similar circumstances: 
(1) Nationals of companies of one Contracting Party whose 
investments in the territory of the other Contracting Party suffer 
losses owing to war or other armed conflict, revolution, a state of 
national emergency, revolt, insurrection or riot in the territory of 
the latter Contracting Party shall be accorded by the latter 
Contracting Party treatment, as regards restitution, 
indemnification, compensation or other settlement, no less 
favourable than that which the latter Contracting Party accords to 
its own nationals or companies or to its nationals or companies of 
any third State. Restitution payments shall be freely transferrable. 
(2) Without prejudice to paragraph (1) of this Article, nationals 
or companies of one Contracting Party who in any of the 
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situations referred to in that paragraph suffer losses in the 
territory of the other Contracting Party resulting from 
(a) requisitioning of their property by its forces or 
authorities, or 
(b) destruction of their property by its forces or authorities, 
which was not caused in combat action or was not required 
by the necessity of the situation, shall be accorded 
restitution or adequate compensation. Resulting payments 
shall be freely transferrable.150 
When combined, the “Exceptions” and “Compensation for 
Losses” provisions of the 2008 UK Model IPPA provide a semblance 
of hierarchy of interests that might be invoked to justify an exception 
from investment treaty protections. Under the “Compensation For 
Losses” provision, for example, in a war, national emergency, or 
similar circumstances, foreign investors would receive essentially 
national treatment. The investor would not, however, be guaranteed 
fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security, or other 
particular protections provided in investment treaties. Environmental 
emergencies, however, do not warrant such a downgrade in investor 
protection, at least according to a plain reading of the clause. Such a 
difference in the treatment of these two interests appears to indicate 
that war is a more serious “interest” that therefore warrants a broader 
exception to investment protection than an environmental emergency. 
 In addition, the financial security provision in the 
“Exceptions” clause of the UK Model IPPA, as noted above, ensures 
that some leeway in treaty protections is available during times of 
economic crisis. The reporting requirement of that clause serves to 
limit the invocation of the clause and discourages after-the-fact 
invocations of the clause. In addition, the clause itself is limited so 
that even with a contemporaneous notification, the exception will 
only apply in “exceptional circumstances” causing “serious 
difficulties” and will protect only measures that are “strictly 
necessary.” Although this provision is not as detailed as the financial 
security provision in the 2012 US Model BIT, it does demonstrate 
that more than one State is concerned about the application of an 
investment treaty during times of financial crisis.151  
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151. Indeed, the Iceland-Mexico BIT also contains a specific clause relating to financial 
emergencies. 
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 Although the 2008 UK Model IPPA exceptions provisions 
demonstrate some consideration of potential emergency situations, 
these provisions are not entirely foolproof. Like the relationship 
between the three separate exceptions provisions in the 2012 US 
Model BIT, the relationship between the “Exceptions” and 
“Compensation for Losses” provisions of the 2008 UK Model IPPA is 
unclear. Moreover, while the “Exceptions” provision appears to 
provide a great deal of protection to the host State’s freedom of action 
in permitting or forbidding the establishment of an investment, that 
protection does not continue throughout the life of an investment. 
Such short-lived freedom of action is unlikely to prove adequate to 
ensure a long-term balance of regulatory freedom with investment 
protection—indeed, such a provision would encourage the host State 
to be parsimonious in permitting the establishment of investments, 
because after the investment is established, the “balance” is shifted to 
the investor, and the host State can no longer regulate with a 
reasonable degree of sovereignty. Thus, although the UK Model IPPA 
offers some guidance on the structuring of exceptions clauses, 
particularly as to the use of reporting requirements, the UK approach 
does not necessarily warrant wholesale adoption. 
  2. The Latvian Model Treaty 
A clearer hierarchy of interests is set forth in Article 13 of the 
Latvian Model BIT. This provision distinguishes logically between 
the consequences of war, as opposed to other aspects of public order 
or health. As this provision states:  
1. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as preventing a 
Contracting Party from taking any action necessary for the 
protection of its essential security interests in time of war or 
armed conflict, or other emergency in international relations. 
2. Provided that such measures are not applied in an arbitrary or 
unjustifiable manner, or do not constitute a disguised restriction 
on international trade or investment, nothing in this Agreement 
shall be construed to prevent a Contracting Party from adopting 
or maintaining measures, including environmental measures: 
(a) Necessary for the maintenance of public order; 
(b) Necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health. 
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3. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to Article 5 
[Expropriation], Article 6 [Compensation for losses] or paragraph 
1(e) of Article 7 [payments pursuant to Articles 5 & 6] of this 
Agreement. 
Under this provision, the hierarchy of exceptions norms is as 
follows: If a measure is necessary to protect essential security 
interests in a time of war or armed conflict, then the agreement’s 
protections generally fall away. If the measure is necessary to 
maintain public order only, however, the measure must meet a higher 
standard—the measure must not be applied “in an arbitrary or 
unjustifiable manner” and must “not constitute a disguised restriction 
on international trade or investment.”152 Thus, as is logical from the 
history of necessity clauses, the Latvian Model treaty provision grants 
a State more freedom of action in responding to war than in 
responding to other types of emergencies. 
In addition, this model provision demonstrates the consequences 
of measures that fall within each part of this provision—the investor 
will still receive damages for actions that constitute expropriation, but 
not for other potential violations of the treaty, such as a failure to 
grant fair and equitable treatment or a violation of full protection and 
security. Thus, although the State has greater freedom of action in 
response to a war as opposed to another type of emergency, the 
financial consequences to the State will be the same regardless of the 
type of interest invoked. 
A potential weakness of this article, however, is its failure to 
include a provision specific to a financial emergency, and thus the 
failure to provide guidance on the consequences of such an 
emergency. The uniqueness of responses to a financial emergency—
and the increasing need to preserve freedom of action in that area—
perhaps warrants the inclusion of a subject-matter specific provision 
to that effect in every investment treaty. For this Latvian provision, 
financial security measures would be protected only if considered part 
of the “maintenance of public order.” Despite this flaw, the Latvian 
Model BIT provides helpful guidance for the US and other States 
examining their exceptions clauses, particularly in its clear 
establishment of a hierarchy of interests and discussion of the 
consequences of invoking an emergency exception. 
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  3. Japan-Korea BIT 
A final example of forward-thinking exceptions clauses in global 
BIT practice is in the Korea-Japan BIT of 2003. Like the US Model 
BIT, this exceptions provision includes self-judging language. Like 
the Latvian BIT, it also sets out a clear hierarchy of interests that 
might warrant invocation of the exceptions clause. In addition, this 
provision contains a specific reference to environmental measures, 
reference to public order, and a reporting requirement. As the 
provision states: 
1. Notwithstanding any other provisions in this Agreement other 
than the provisions of Article 11, each Contracting Party may:  
(a) take any measure which it considers necessary for the 
protection of its essential security interests;  
(i) taken in time of war, or armed conflict, or other 
emergency in that Contracting Party or in international 
relations; or  
(ii) relating to the implementation of national policies or 
international agreements respecting the non-proliferation of 
weapons; 
(b) take any measure in pursuance of its obligations under the 
United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international 
peace and security; 
(c) take any measure necessary to protect human, animal or plant 
life or health; or  
(d) take any measure necessary for the maintenance of public 
order. The public order exceptions may be invoked only where a 
genuine and sufficiently serious threat is posed to one of the 
fundamental interests of society.  
2. In cases where a Contracting Party takes any measure, 
pursuant to paragraph 1 above, that does not conform with the 
obligations of the provisions of this Agreement other than the 
provisions of Article 11, that Contracting Party shall not use such 
measure as a means of avoiding its obligations.  
3. In cases where a Contracting Party takes any measure, 
pursuant to paragraph 1 above, that does not conform with the 
obligations of the provisions of this Agreement other than the 
provisions of Article 11, that Contracting Party shall, prior to the 
entry into force of the measure or as soon thereafter as possible, 
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notify the other Contracting Party of the following elements of 
the measure:  
(a) sector and sub-sector or matter;  
(b) obligation or article in respect of which the measure is taken;  
(c) legal source or authority of the measure;  
(d) succinct description of the measure; and  
(e) motivation or purpose of the measure.  
This provision has two innovative elements that combine to 
make it an extremely effective exceptions clause. First, the clause sets 
out examples of interests that might concern a State’s “essential 
security” that serve confine the term to matters related to war. By so 
limiting the definition of “essential security,” the self-judging 
language in this provision of the Japan-Korea BIT becomes more 
palatable to the international community because, although the self-
judging language might permit broad freedom of action, the ability to 
so act would apply only in limited factual circumstances, i.e., in a 
war. 
The second innovative element of this provision is its detailed 
notification requirement in Section 3 quoted above. A bare-bones 
notification provision, such as the one included in the 2008 UK 
Model IPPA, serves a general purpose of discouraging after-the-fact 
invocations of the clause. The more detailed requirement of the 
Japan-Korea BIT, however, serves additional purposes. By requiring 
the host-State to specify the sector and sub-sector in which the 
measure is taken, the notification requirement gives the host-State the 
incentive to limit the scope of the measure in question to that which is 
strictly necessary to address the emergency. By requiring the State to 
identify the legal source of the measure taken, this notification 
requirement helps ensure that the State will not violate its own law in 
taking measures in response to an emergency, thus providing greater 
predictability for investors. Finally, by requiring that the State note 
the obligation or article with respect to which the measure is taken, 
this notification requirement allows the host State to choose for itself 
the consequences of its emergency measures—for example, the State 
can notify its treaty partner that a certain measure will be excepted 
from all substantive obligations of the treaty except national 
treatment, or that only protection against expropriation will apply. By 
forcing the State to choose the consequences of its emergency 
measure, this notification requirement allows nuance for States 
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seeking to balance the ability to address emergency situations, while 
still retaining protection of investors. 
A potential weakness of the exceptions clause in the Japan-
Korea BIT is that it may be too permissive for the host State. This 
clause is phrased in positive terms—“each contracting party may” 
take certain measures—as opposed to the general practice of phrasing 
an emergency exception in negative terms—a measure in derogation 
may be taken “only if” or “Nothing in this agreement shall be 
construed to preclude.” Phrasing the emergency provision in such 
permissive language makes that clause not so much an exception, but 
more like a limiting clause to the treaty’s protection, and could 
discourage investment due to the breadth of freedom allowed to the 
host State at the expense of protection of investment. 
  C. Conclusions and Themes from Comparative Analysis 
 As the above-quoted comparative examples demonstrate, 
States have long been careful to preserve their freedom of action as a 
general matter in investment treaties. In recent years, States have also 
sought to specifically preserve their freedom to act in response to 
environmental disasters and financial disasters, as well as in times of 
war or revolution or public emergency. States have accordingly 
included fact-specific exceptions clauses in their investment treaties, 
and also expanded the language of general exceptions clauses to 
preserve an exit to treaty requirements during emergencies of 
unanticipated types. Despite expanding their freedom of action, States 
have maintained their commitment to investment protection by 
requiring notice to treaty parties when an exceptions clause is invoked 
and by offering at least limited compensation to the investors 
affected. 
 Recent global investment treaty practice presents three themes 
that could serve as guidance in the future US-China BIT, or in other 
US BITs. First, States generally permit some compensation for 
investment treaty violations, particularly when the measure causing 
the violation was in response to something less than war or 
revolution. Such a result is logical, given that, under the general 
hierarchy of interests that might give rise to an emergency exception, 
an environmental or financial disaster is seen as less of a threat to the 
existence of a State than a war. 
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A second theme from this comparative analysis, which could 
serve as a guide the US-China BIT negotiations, is the use of 
reporting or notification requirements to preserve investor protections 
in times of emergency. Reporting or notification serves as a form of 
restraint, and helps to prevent after-the-fact attempts to justify certain 
action based on imagined or manufactured concern for the 
environment, financial hardship, or other seemingly-legitimate 
circumstances. Such a reporting requirement, and the use of reporting, 
would have an effect that was exactly the opposite of a self-judging 
clause—rather than undermining the legitimacy of the plea because of 
its unmoored nature, the reporting requirement serves to support the 
legitimacy of a plea under one of these clauses by establishing the 
host State’s reliance on that clause from an early date. A detailed 
reporting requirement, such as the one included in the Japan-Korea 
BIT may be the most useful because it requires the State to consider 
the scope and effect of its actions. 
Finally, the United States and China could observe other States’ 
differentiation of the consequences that flow from the invocation of 
differing interests as the source of the emergency. For the most 
significant interests which obviously threaten the existence of the 
State most seriously—such as responding to war—it may be that no 
investment protections apply. For other interests, where the threat to 
the existence of the State is less palpable, national treatment 
protections might apply or expropriation alone might remain 
prohibited. The establishment of clear and differentiated 
consequences for these different types of emergencies allows both 
States and investors to appreciate the status of an investment during a 
crisis of various types, and allows them to plan and balance the 
treaty’s goals. 
These three lessons lead to a logical proposal for alternative 
language for a potential emergency clause of the forthcoming US-
China BIT. Such a proposal, and an explanation for the changes, is 
presented in the next section.  
IV. THE WAY FORWARD IN US BITS 
The foregoing analysis suggests that a well-considered 
exceptions clause would include (1) a hierarchy of interests that give 
rise to such exceptions; (2) a clear statement of the consequences of 
measures that fall within the exceptions clause; and (3) a requirement 
of timely notice by the host State to its treaty partner of any measure 
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taken in response to an emergency. Incorporating these three 
characteristics, the US-China BIT might include a clause along the 
lines of the following: 
Art ###. Exceptions. 
(1) Nothing in this treaty shall be construed to preclude a Party 
from taking 
(a) measures it considers necessary for the fulfillment of its 
obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of 
international peace or security, or the protection of its own 
essential security interests, such as measures 
(i) taken in time of war, or armed conflict, or other 
emergency in that Contracting Party or in international 
relations; or  
(ii) relating to the implementation of national policies or 
international agreements respecting the non-proliferation of 
weapons; 
(b) measures necessary to ensure that investment activity in its 
territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental 
concerns. 
(c) measures relating to financial services undertaken for 
prudential reasons, including the protection of investors, 
depositors, policy holders, or persons to whom a fiduciary 
duty is owed by a financial services supplier, or to ensure the 
integrity and stability of the financial system. 
(d) measures relating to investors of the other Party, or 
covered investments, in financial institutions that are 
necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations that 
are not inconsistent with this Treaty, including those related to 
the prevention of deceptive and fraudulent practices or that 
deal with the effects of a default on financial services 
contracts.  
 
(2) This provision shall apply in addition to, and independent of 
any exceptions in customary international law. 
 
(3) When a Party takes any measure, pursuant to paragraph (1) 
above, that Party shall, prior to the entry into force of the 
measure or as soon thereafter as possible, notify the other Party 
of the following elements of the measure:  
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(a) sector and sub-sector or matter;  
(b) obligation or article in respect of which the measure is 
taken;  
(c) legal source or authority of the measure;  
(d) succinct description of the measure; and  
(e) motivation or purpose of the measure.  
 
(4) If a measure falls within Part (1)(a) of this article, no 
compensation shall be due for any action that would be deemed 
violation of the treaty, but for the application of this provision. 
 
(5) If a measure falls within Part (1)(b) to (1)(d) of this article, 
the investment shall be accorded national treatment. 
 
(6) If a measure falls within Part (1)(c) or (1)(d) of this article, 
then the following provisions shall apply  
(a)  [the 2012 US Model BIT provision that requires 
appointment of arbitrators with expertise in financial matters] 
(b) [the 2012 US Model BIT provision that allows the finance 
ministries of both States’ party to the treaty to agree that the 
measure was taken in response to a financial emergency] 
(c)  [the 2012 US Model BIT provision that allows for 
preliminary determination of the application of the financial 
services exception] 
The text suggested above has several advantages over the 
exceptions provisions in the 2012 Model BIT. First, like the Latvian 
Model BIT, the suggested text sets out a clear hierarchy of interests 
that might warrant departure from the treaty norms, and—at parts (4) 
and (5)—defines the various consequences of invoking the exceptions 
clause. Like the 2008 UK Model IPPA, the clause provides for 
national treatment for all types of emergencies except war. The clause 
also includes a detailed notification requirement, like the Japan-Korea 
BIT, which will require the host State to consider the effects and 
scope of the measure it is taking. The suggested text retains the self-
judging language for the essential security provision at part (1)(a), but 
like the Japan-Korea BIT, it includes language that clearly limits this 
essential security provision to time of war, when self-judgment would 
be most appropriate and least likely to unduly compromise investment 
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protection and cause concern among treaty partners. In addition, the 
text suggested above retains the extremely well-considered procedural 
provisions of the “Financial Services” provision of the 2012 Model 
BIT, and it includes a provision that clarifies the relationship—or lack 
of relationship—between the treaty provision and any concept of 
necessity in customary international law. Finally, the suggested text 
eliminates the ambiguous distinction between “measures necessary” 
and “measures appropriate” in the context of the environmental 
exception by simply applying the “necessary” language to all types of 
exceptions. 
A clause such as the one suggested above would go a long way 
towards clarifying investor-State relations before any arbitrations 
arise, thus giving certainty to the parties’ obligations and leaving less 
to the whims of arbitral tribunals. In the US-China context, where the 
stakes are billions in investment and potentially billions in investment 
arbitration awards, clarity and certainty in treaty-drafting is required. 
CONCLUSION 
 The forthcoming US-China BIT will spark not only new 
investment, but also new investment arbitration. Both States should 
prepare for this eventuality, and include in their treaty a sensible, 
practical exceptions provision that preserves the host State’s freedom 
of action, while balancing protection of investment. A comparative 
analysis of exceptions clauses in global BIT practice provides one 
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